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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), was decided on 
March 28, 1989. Prior to Davis, the law supported Defendants' 
method of taxation. The Davis decision profoundly altered state 
taxation. 
This Court should view the date of the decision as the 
watershed event in deciding this case. Neither Plaintiffs nor 
Defendants could have reasonably foreseen the implications of 
Davis, a decision which has exposed twenty-three states to 
massive potential refund liability. The lack of foreseeability 
and surprise is evident from the failure of any member of 
Plaintiffs' Class to pay their taxes under protest prior to 
Davis, to ever file a petition for relief before the Tax 
Commission, or to ever challenge the law in any state or federal 
court. Plaintiffs' conduct prior to March 28, 1989, is the best 
proof of the revolutionary nature of the Davis decision. 
Plaintiffs seek to obtain refunds for four years. 
However, Davis did not mandate refunds; Davis mandated equal 
treatment. The issue of refunds was absent from the Supreme 
Court's consideration because Michigan had conceded a refund if 
Mr. Davis prevailed. 
Plaintiffs have ignored the Legislature's special 
session to amend Utah's law and the fact that Utah has now 
totally implemented the rule in Davis by treating all retirees 
equally, retroactive to January 1, 1989. 
Unsatisfied with the legislative action, Plaintiffs now 
seek the benefit of the modest exemption given to state employees 
prior to Davis. They demand 104 million dollars in refunds for 
tax years 1985-1988 compared to the 8.3 million dollars benefit 
given to state retirees for the same period. 
The Court should view this case from the vantage point 
of March 28, 1989. The Court will see from that perspective that 
Utah has complied with Davis, and that the Plaintiffs are not 
entitled in law or equity to the refund they seek. The 
Legislature applied the rule in Davis expeditiously and fairly. 
No further relief need be given in the form of unexpected 
refunds. Plaintiffs' demand would fiscally punish the citizens 
of Utah for the modest preference to former state employees. 
POINT I 
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAW MANDATES TAX REFUNDS. 
A. Applying the Beam Decision. 
1. State Courts After Beam Have Found That The 
Issue of Retroactivity Was Not Before the 
Court in Davis. Accordingly, the Chevron 
Test Mandates Purely Prospective Application 
of Davis. 
Because Michigan conceded a refund to the taxpayer in 
Davis, the question of retroactivity was moot. Davis, 489 U.S. 
at 817. The Court did not address it. Accordingly, Davis should 
be applied prospectively. 
Numerous state courts, after James B. Beam v. Georgia, 
111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991), have found that Davis should be 
-2-
prospectively applied. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Bass 
v. South Carolina, 23216 (South Carolina Supreme Court, January 
27, 1992), found: 
[I]n Davis, the retroactivity issue was not 
before the Court because Michigan conceded 
that the refunds were due to Davis under 
state law if the statute were held 
unconstitutional . . . . Furthermore, the 
principle of equality or equal treatment to 
similarly situated litigants does not require 
that all future litigants, including the 
litigants in the present case, are bound by 
the stipulation of the State of Michigan in 
Davis. 
Three other state appellate courts, after Beam/ have 
used similar reasoning to find that Davis be prospectively 
applied. See Duffy v. Wetzler, 90-07800, (N.Y. App. Div., 
January 15, 1992) ("We would also note consistently with the Beam 
decision that the Davis court never applied its own rule since 
Michigan 'conceded that a refund [was] appropriate . . . . ' " ) ; 
see also Swanson v. North Carolina, 407 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1991) 
("In Beam the Court had an opportunity to say that the rule of 
Chevron should no longer be applied in civil cases, but it 
declined to do so."); see also Sheehv v. Montana, 820 P.2d 1257 
(Mont. 1991) (the issue of retroactivity of Davis was not before 
the Court). This Court should also decide that Davis should be 
prospectively applied. 
Plaintiffs assert Beam "is dispositive of the 
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retroactivity issue."1 (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 13, 
(emphasis added).) This is doubtful in light of the post-Beam 
cases discussed above. Plaintiffs argue that Beam makes Davis 
apply retroactively on three grounds.2 All of these arguments 
are meaningless because the issue was not raised in the Davis 
litigation. This position supported the state court decisions 
discussed above. This Court should adopt the reasoning of those 
courts. 
2. Justice Souter's Citation to Davis in 
Beam Received Only His Vote and One 
Other; It Should Be Given Little Weight. 
The citation to Davis in Justice Souter's opinion in 
1
 Plaintiffs further allege that Beam is "a 6-3 opinion." 
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 14.) Plaintiffs would have this 
Court believe that Beam is a majority opinion. The Beam decision 
caused a New York intermediate court to remark: "It goes without 
saying that Beam is not susceptible to easy explanation and 
requires the unsalutatory procedure, as in all plurality decisions, 
of a judicial head-count." Duffy v. Wetzler, 90-07800, (N.Y. App. 
Div. January 15, 1992). This Court can review Beam to determine if 
it is "dispositive" and if it commands a majority of the Court. 
Copy attached as Appendix. 
2
 Plaintiffs argue: 
Under the Beam analysis, a U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion is retroactive to its litigants and 
thus to all others, if 1) the court applied 
its decision retroactively, or 2) the court 
allowed consideration of remedies, or 3) the 
court did not reserve the issue of 
retroactivity (silence). 
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 17. 
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Beam was a "cf."3 Plaintiffs argue "[i]f there is any doubt on 
this issue [whether Davis applies retroactively], the Beam 
court's citation to Davis as analogous supporting authority 
should resolve the issue", (Petitioners' Opening Brief at 20, 
(emphasis in original).) Plaintiffs mislead this Court by 
arguing that the "Beam court" spoke on this issue. The citation 
Defendants refer to appears in Justice Souter's opinion. Ill 
S.Ct. 2439 (1991) (Souter, J., Plurality Opinion announcing 
Court's decision). It was one of five opinions. It was not a 
majority opinion. Plaintiffs are asking this Court to base its 
decision on dicta/ which was cryptic at best, and received only 
Justice Souter's vote and one other. It is also contrary to the 
opinions of the numerous state appellate courts dealing with 
Davis related actions in a post-Beam time frame. 
B. The Proper Test for Determining Whether Davis 
Applies Retroactively is the Chevron Test. 
A decision will operate prospectively only: 
1. If a new principle of law is established by 
3
 The meaning of "cf." is: 
Cited authority supports a proposition 
different from the main proposition but 
sufficiently analogous to lend support. 
Literally, 'cf.' means compare. The 
citation's relevance will usually be clear to 
the reader only if it is explained. 
The Blue Book: A Uniform System of Citation, 15th Edition at 23, 
(1991) (Published and distributed by the Harvard Law Review 
Association.) In Beam, no parenthetical explanation was given by 
Justice Souter; this Court should give it little weight. 
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overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; 
2. If prospective only application will not retard 
the operation of the rule in question; and 
3. If retroactive application will result in 
inequity, injustice, or hardship. Chevron v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 
106-107 (1971). 
1. Davis Operates Prospectively Under the First 
Chevron Factor. 
a. It is Undisputed that the "Significant 
Difference" Standard Set Forth in Davis 
is a New Rule of Law. 
Plaintiffs do not rebut that the "significant 
difference" standard in Davis is a new rule of law. The previous 
constitutional standards were uprooted by the Davis decision. 
(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 57-60.) Accordingly, Davis 
established a new rule of law. 
b. Davis is a Case of First Impression 
Holding that § 111 Immunity From 
Discriminatory Taxation is Co-extensive 
With the Constitutional Doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' position, that § 111 
immunity from discriminatory taxation is coextensive with the 
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is a 
new rule of law, "is incredible." (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 
35.) They make two arguments. 
First, they allege "the U.S. Supreme Court expressly 
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relied on a long line of cases. . . ." (Plaintiffs' Opening 
Brief at 36,) However, Plaintiffs neither provide supporting 
authority nor give an explanation of the law's development. The 
development of the law in this area is explained in Defendants' 
Opening Brief. (See Defendants' Opening Brief at 55-57.) 
Plaintiffs concede, "Davis is the first case interpreting § 111 . 
• . ." (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 34 n.12.) Because the U.S. 
Supreme Court had not previously considered the issues in Davis, 
this interpretation of § 111 was a matter of first impression. 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the "plain meaning" of 4 
U.S.C. § 111 is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity from state 
taxation. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 36.) The lack of 
plainness within the context of Davis is underscored by the fact 
that the statute went unchallenged for decades. Accordingly, 
this Court should find that Davis established a new rule of law. 
c. The holding that the 'pay or 
compensation for personal service as an 
officer or employee of the United 
States' applies to pension benefits 
received by employees was a new rule of 
law. 
In Davis, the Court remarked that "Congress could 
perhaps have used more precise language" in suggesting that 
current pay to federal employees constituted deferred 
compensation, the taxation of which would be in violation of the 
intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Davis, 489 U.S. at 810. 
Plaintiffs argue that Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524 
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(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984), holds 
federal pensions are deferred wages. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief 
at 34.) However, Kizas held that statutes and regulations 
determine federal employees' rights; it did not discuss the 
deferred compensation issue. id. at 534-538. 
Not one of the three cases cited in Davis was decided 
under § 111. The cases lack analysis of whether retirement 
benefits constitute deferred compensation. Consequently, 
Defendants could not have foreseen the new rule in Davis. 
One of the cited cases held that federal pensioners are 
a class distinct from state and private pensioners to whom "[t]he 
United States . . . has special responsibilities and obligations 
• . . that it does not have to non-federal retirees." Clark v. 
United States, 691 F.2d 837, 841-842 (7th Cir. 1982). 
Consequently, disparate treatment between State and private 
pensioners would appear to be a logical extension of the Clark 
holding. 
Plaintiffs cite Fitzpatrick v. Tax Comm'n, 386 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1963), for the proposition that the Tax Commission's 
position is that retirement income is deferred compensation. 
(See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 34-35.) Plaintiffs ignore the 
distinguishing facts in Fitzpatrick. (See Defendants' Opening 
Brief at 54 n.14.) Fitzpatrick was decided under common law 
contract principles. 
Conversely, the analysis applied to federal workers 
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must be based on federal statutes and regulations. See Kizas, 
707 F.2d at 535. Plaintiffs admit that " [interpreting a federal 
statute is a far different matter from interpreting the 
Constitution or common law." (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 25.) 
Accordingly, Davis indeed established a new rule of law by 
holding that "pay or compensation for personal service as an 
officer or employee of the United States" included pension 
benefits. 
2. Prospective Only Application Will Not Retard 
the Operation of the Davis Case. 
Utah has satisfied the second prong of Chevron by 
amending its statute. No additional action is necessary. Utah's 
statute is fully implemented. It provides equal treatment to all 
retirees. Accordingly, prospective only application of Davis is 
appropriate. 
3. The Overwhelming Evidence Contained in the 
Record Supports a Finding that Retroactive 
Application of the Davis Decision Would 
Result in Inequity, Injustice, and Hardship. 
If Plaintiffs prevail, the refund is estimated at 104 
million dollars. (R. 725.) This is in contrast to 8.3 million 
dollars estimated benefit received by state retirees for the same 
years. (R. 1059 . ) 
Prior to the Davis decision, the legality of the tax 
exemption had never been contested in Utah administrative or 
court proceedings. (R. 701, 707, 713-14, 717, 1031, 1054-55.) 
The Utah State Tax Commission believed it was acting lawfully in 
-9-
taxing federal retirement income based upon existing laws. (R. 
713.) The State relied in good faith on preferential treatment 
of state employees as part of a benefit program for state 
employees. (R. 701, 707.) The State has expended the 
unprotested taxes paid by retirees for years 1985-1988; the funds 
are no longer available for refunds. (R. 702, 708.) Thousands 
of other taxpayers have paid taxes on their private pension 
income yet have no claim for monetary relief. Plaintiffs insist 
that other taxpayers should now pay more or suffer program 
reductions so Plaintiffs can receive the benefit of the 
exemption. Nothing could be more unfair. The equities mandate 
prospective only application of Davis. 
Plaintiffs fail to rebut the fiscal impact of 
retroactive application of Davis on the State of Utah, and the 
state's reliance on Plaintiffs' past inaction/ (R. 699-789, 
Exhibits A-I.) Instead, they argue: 
When the trial court agreed and granted the 
motion to strike the affidavits submitted by 
Defendants, Plaintiffs did not need to 
present any evidence contesting the 
affidavits. Should this court determine the 
trial court erred in striking Defendants' 
affidavits, the proper course on remand would 
be to allow the Plaintiffs the opportunity to 
present evidence regarding hardship to 
A
 Plaintiffs ask this Court to take judicial notice of 
Deseret News articles dated January 6-7, 1992. (Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief at 64 n. 36.) Defendants Object. Plaintiffs fail to 
show that this source meets the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 
201(b). Plaintiffs also fail to meet the relevancy requirements of 
Utah R. Evid. 401 and 403. 
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members of the class and regarding the second 
and third prongs of Chevron. 
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 29 n.9. 
This request misleads the Court. The District Court 
ruled on the Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike at 
the same hearing. (See Defendants' Opening Brief Appendix 4 at 
pp. 3-5.) Consequently, Plaintiffs' claim that they did not need 
to submit affidavits because the Court had already ruled them as 
irrelevant contradicts the record. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides: "The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits." 
Thus, when the District Court heard the Motion to Strike, the 
time had expired for Plaintiffs to file opposing affidavits. It 
would be inappropriate to ignore Rule 56 and allow Plaintiffs to 
supplement the record. 
C. The Plain Language of 4 U.S.C. § 111 Did Not 
Compel the Davis Holding; Statutory Interpretation 
was Required. 
Plaintiffs argue that this Court need not apply the 
Chevron retroactivity doctrine because § 111 is plain and 
unambiguous. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 22.) Section 111 
provides: 
The United States consents to the taxation of 
pay or compensation for personal service as 
an officer or employee of the United States, 
a territory or possession or political 
subdivision thereof, the government of the 
District of Columbia, or an agency or 
instrumentality of one or more of the 
foregoing, by a duly constituted taxing 
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authority having jurisdiction, if the 
taxation does not discriminate against the 
officer or employee because of the source of 
the pay or compensation. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The plain language of § 111 bars discriminatory 
taxation "of pay or compensation for personal service." It says 
nothing of retirement annuities. Further, it bars discriminatory 
taxation of any "officer or employee" of the federal government. 
It mentions nothing about former officers and employees of the 
federal government. To reach such a conclusion, the statute must 
be interpreted. Because it is subject to interpretation, it is 
not plain and unambiguous. 
Michigan made a similar argument in Davis. The 
majority in Davis concluded that this type of a "hypertechnical 
reading of the nondiscrimination clause is not inconsistent with 
the language of that provision examined in isolation . . . ." 
Davis, 489 U.S. at 809. The Court went on to construe the 
statute to provide a different meaning. Ixi. The Davis majority 
also found that "Congress could perhaps have used more precise 
language . . . . " in drafting § 111. JId. The dissent gave the 
statute yet another meaning. See id. at 818 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting). Also, numerous state courts have given their own 
interpretations to pre-Davis § 111. These differing 
interpretations of § 111 emphasize that there is no plain and 
unambiguous interpretation of § 111. Accordingly, the statute is 
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susceptible to interpretation, 
D. It is Undisputed that the Court's Order Striking 
Defendants' Affidavits, Which are Relevant Under 
the Federal Analysis, Exceeded the Bench Ruling, 
It is undisputed that the District Court's bench ruling 
specifically struck only four of Defendants' affidavits. It is 
also undisputed that no objections were made to four additional 
affidavits attached to Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities In Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (See Defendants' Opening Brief at 79.) The stricken 
affidavits are relevant under the Chevron analysis. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the Order striking all of 
Defendants' Affidavits. 
E. It is Undisputed that the District Court Erred in 
Holding that Plaintiffs were Entitled to Tax 
Refunds Pursuant to State Law. 
Plaintiffs have not disputed that the District Court 
erred in finding that Plaintiffs merited a tax refund solely 
under State law.5 (See Defendants' Opening Brief at 39-47.) 
The Plaintiffs argue that this Court should first determine the 
meaning of 4 U.S.C. § 111. (See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 9-
4 0.). They provide no grounds for a tax refund that operates 
independently of that federal statute. Accordingly, the District 
Court must be reversed. 
5
 Defendants also rely on the state law defenses of laches 
and waiver. (See Defendants' Opening Brief at 44-47.) As 
previously argued, the District Court erred by not finding 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by these defenses. 
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POINT II 
REMEDIES. 
The remedy ordered by the District Court was draconian 
and the Court abused its discretion. Without support, Plaintiffs 
assert that Defendants would not make such a claim were 
Plaintiffs fewer in number. 
Plaintiffs ignore the legal doctrine of this Court in 
Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984). In 
Rio Alqom, this Court was confronted with the constitutionality 
of a property tax statute providing for preferential treatment of 
centrally assessed versus locally assessed taxpayers. After 
ruling the statute in question unconstitutional, this Court went 
on to deal at length with the issue of a prospective versus 
retroactive remedy. In Rio Alqom, this Court relied on other 
states' case law and granted a prospective-only remedy: 
These state decisions rely on the need to 
preserve the financial solvency of local 
government units, the great financial and 
administrative hardship that would be 
entailed if general retroactive effect were 
allowed, and the tax authorities' justifiable 
reliance on the statute, which is 
presumptively constitutional. To the 
objection that an unconstitutional act is 
void from its inception so that everything 
done thereunder must be undone, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court cited the importance of 
recognizing "that we are acting within the 
framework of appropriate equitable relief 
with respect to an unconstitutional taxation 
statute." Salorio v. Glazer, 93 N.J. at 563, 
461 A.2d at 1108. In fashioning an equitable 
remedy, reliance interests weigh heavily, and 
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the court should seek a blend of what is 
necessary, what is fair, and what is 
workable. 
Id. at 196. 
In Rio Alqom, a number of taxpayers paid their taxes 
under protest prior to the Court's decision. However, this Court 
directed that the holding of unconstitutionality be prospective 
from January 1, 19 84, the year in which the decision was 
announced. The Court granted retroactive relief to the parties 
who paid under protest, timely prosecuted their appeals, and put 
the state and local taxing authorities on notice of the 
constitutional challenge. In this case, the only payments under 
protest were made for tax year 1988. Plaintiffs' claims should 
be treated consistently within the framework, of Rio Alqom, and in 
no case should relief be given where no payments under protest 
were made. 
Both parties have discussed the impact of McKesson 
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 110 S.Ct. 
2238 (1990). Plaintiffs suggest that Utah provides no 
predeprivation proceedings consistent with that case. (See 
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 60-62.) This ignores the 
declaratory judgment statute and administrative rule to request 
declaratory judgments before the Tax Commission. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-21 (1) (1989); see also Utah Admin. R861-1-5A 
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(Q).6 Plaintiffs' claim also ignores the alternative of not 
paying the tax and being subject to a subsequent audit. Many 
federal retirees chose the latter alternative. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-501 through 505. 
It is Defendants' position that McKesson does not 
dispose of the present proceeding for four reasons: (1) McKesson 
involves a Commerce Clause issue; (2) Utah provides 
predeprivation remedies; (3) McKesson involved a clear and 
foreseeable constitutional violation, and (4) most importantly, 
McKesson was a remedies, not a choice of law case. However, the 
case suggests remedies which Plaintiffs have overlooked and which 
McKesson indicated would satisfy minimum federal due process 
requirements. (See Defendants' Opening Brief at 83.)7 It is 
clear from McKesson and Utah law that a number of remedies exist 
that are less draconian than the full refund Plaintiffs demand. 
In their argument that equity follows the law, 
Plaintiffs cite a dissent at length. See Swanson v. State, 407 
S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1991). While arguing that the law ought to be 
6
 Formerly R865-05A(P) (1987); A12-01-1:5(6) (1983). 
7
 In McKesson, the Supreme Court gave the following 
examples of postdeprivation remedies that satisfy minimum federal 
Due Process requirements. 
1. Full refund of tax assessed over the amount 
competitors had been charged; 
2. Collection of back taxes from those parties 
benefiting from lower tax rates; and 
3. A combination of tax refunds to Petitioners and 
retroactive taxation of those parties taxed at a lower rate. id. 
at 2252. 
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followed, Plaintiffs ignore the available statutory and 
administrative procedures discussed herein. 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to view this case as 34 
thousand small cases. However viewed, the impact is the same --
104 million dollars of potential refunds to a class of Plaintiffs 
who never filed one administrative or judicial proceeding prior 
to the Davis decision. Had the State persisted in allowing the 
state retiree exemption in a post-Davis setting, Plaintiffs' 
claim of foreseeability would be more understandable. Given the 
surprise and revolutionary nature of the Davis decision, to 
imperil all of the State's other taxpayers and its already leanly 
budgeted programs is inequitable. 
In other states with similar statutes, where liability 
related to Davis has been established, more reasonable remedies 
have been fashioned. The Arizona Tax Court ruled that Arizona 
federal retirees should be entitled to a refund equal to the 
increment of tax which they would not have had to pay had the 
preference for state employees not existed. Bohn v. Waddell, 807 
P.2d 1 (Ariz. Tax 1991). The Arizona relief granted Plaintiffs 
six cents on the dollar, and put them in a position they would 
have enjoyed had the state retiree exemption not existed. 
Because of Plaintiffs' generous federal pensions and 
the large number of federal retirees, the refund may amount to 
104 million dollars; whereas, the cost to the state for the state 
retirees preference for 1985-1988 was 8.3 million dollars. (R. 
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725, 1059.) Clearly Plaintiffs' demand under the facts is 
excessive. 
The Utah Legislature has twice had the opportunity to 
ratify Plaintiffs' view of this case and order refunds. The 
first opportunity was when the retirement law was amended in 
September 1989. Retirement Exemption Elimination Act, 1989 Utah 
Laws ch. 7 §§ 1-4. The second opportunity was in February 199 0 
when the filing period for 1985 claims was extended. Tax Filing 
Amendments Act, 1990 Utah Laws ch. 21 §§ 1-4. Both times, the 
Legislature chose not to grant Plaintiffs' requests. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CLASS DEFINITION IS OVERBROAD. 
A. The Remedy Procedure for Taxes Deemed Illegal is 
Payment Under Protest and Filing Suit in District 
Court. Only a Few Members of Plaintiffs' Class 
Have Followed This Procedure. 
To receive a refund of allegedly illegal taxes, an 
individual Plaintiff must have first paid these taxes under 
protest and then filed an action in District Court. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-301. Defendants concede that the District Court 
has jurisdiction for any Plaintiff meeting this requirement. A 
six month statute of limitations applies. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-31 (1987). Anyone who has not complied with this statutory 
requirement cannot be included within the class. The class as 
defined includes the years 1985-1988. (R. 281.) However, there 
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is nothing in the record showing payment under protest for years 
1985-1987. 
1. There Can Be No "Overpayment" Without 
Retroactive Application of Davis, 
Plaintiffs argue for tax refunds under an "overpayment" 
theory. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529(1-6). There is a three 
year limitations period for actions brought under this statute. 
However, Plaintiffs' analysis begs the fundamental question: 
What is the meaning of "overpayment," and what is the proper 
forum for "overpayment" claims? 
At the time these taxes were paid, there was no 
overpayment. The application of the Utah tax exemption to 
federal retirees went unchallenged for at least 40 years. When 
Plaintiffs calculated, filed, and paid their taxes there was no 
"overpayment." All taxes were proper prior to the Davis 
decision. Consequently, this Court should determine that 
"overpayment" never occurred for tax years prior to the date of 
that decision. 
Plaintiffs' argument is that Utah has incorporated the 
federal definition of "overpayment," and it includes illegal 
taxes. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 47.) In support of this, 
Plaintiffs argue that the federal government has repealed its 
payment under protest requirement for illegal taxes. (Id., at 
45. ) 
In contrast, Utah has two separate statutes to the 
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federal government's single "overpayment" provision. One statute 
governs "overpayments." The procedure under this statute is to 
seek relief by filing a refund claim with the Utah State Tax 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-531(1). The second statute 
specifically governs where taxes are alleged to be illegal. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-301. The procedure under this statute is to 
seek a remedy in the District Court by paying the tax under 
protest and then bringing suit. There is no need to incorporate 
the specific "illegal tax" provision into the more general 
overpayment statute as the federal government has done. The 
federal government has done this because the federal illegal tax 
provision has been repealed. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 45.) 
The Utah Income Tax Act requires Utah "to conform, to 
the extent practicable, certain of the existing rules of 
procedure . . . to corresponding or apposite rules of 
administration and procedure prescribed by the federal income tax 
laws . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102(4) (1987) (emphasis 
added). Definitions are the same as those under federal law 
"unless a different meaning is clearly required . . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-103(2) (1987 and Supp. 1991). Plaintiffs 
concede that there is no "corresponding or apposite" federal 
rules of procedure allowing a party to elect a remedy depending 
on the nature of the tax. Accordingly, the federal definition of 
"overpayment," which includes alleged illegal taxes, cannot be 
incorporated into the Utah "overpayment" statute. 
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Utah has a specific remedial provision for alleged 
illegal taxes. Because that provision is on point, the broad 
federal definition of "overpayment" does not apply. Therefore, 
the Court must apply § 59-1-301 as a procedural bar to any 
Plaintiffs who have not paid tax under protest and filed suit 
within six months in the District Court. The District Court 
improperly included in the class definition claims for tax years 
1985-1987. There is no evidence showing that any Plaintiff paid 
under protest for those years. Hence, the District Court had no 
jurisdiction over those claims. It should be reversed. 
2. Plaintiffs' Argument That Payment Under 
Protest Was Repealed More Than Sixty Years 
Ago Ignores the Wright Decision Made Twelve 
Years Ago By This Court. 
Plaintiffs argue: M[w]ith its incorporation of federal 
tax law and procedure, Utah has adopted a system which rejected a 
protest requirement for income taxes more than sixty years ago." 
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 45 (footnote and emphasis 
omitted). ) 
Plaintiffs ignore Utah law. In Tax Comm'n v. Wright, 
596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979), a taxpayer sought to test the legality 
of different income tax rates for married and single persons. 
Id. The Court found that: 
'[I]t is not for the tax commission to 
determine questions of legality or 
constitutionality of legislative enactments.' 
Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 120 P.2d 274 
(1941). These questions could, however, have 
been raised by an independent action in a 
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district court pursuant to Sections 59-11-10 
or 59-11-11 [Present 59-1-301 (payment under 
protest)]. 
Id. at 636 (footnote omitted),8 Thus, for Plaintiffs to argue 
that Section 59-1-301 was repealed over sixty years ago is 
contrary to Wright. 
3. Section 59-10-529 Is An Administrative 
Remedy. It is Unavailable in the District 
Court. 
Plaintiffs fail to understand that the remedy set forth 
in § 59-10-529 is an administrative remedy. They attempt to use 
it to expand the size of the class. Plaintiffs rely on Pacific 
Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 316 P.2d 549 
(1957). (See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 49-53.) In Pacific 
Intermountain, the taxpayer contested the validity of a sales tax 
and sought redress in the district court. Id.. His challenge was 
based on statutory interpretation. Id., at 550. The challenge 
was not one of illegality or unconstitutionality of tax laws. He 
argued that the District Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-11-11, (1953) [§ 59-1-301]. However, the Tax 
Commission claimed it had administrative jurisdiction under the 
sales tax act. The issue before the Court was procedural: "Can 
an action to recover sales tax be maintained in the district 
court?" Id_. at 550. 
The Court concluded that there was a conflict between 
8
 For the history of present 59-1-301 see Defendants' 
Opening Brief at 22 n.l. 
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the statutes argued by the parties. It said: 
Sec, 59-11-11 [present § 59-1-301] is of 
ancient origin. It has existed in our law 
since statehood, and sets out the historical 
method of contesting payment of taxes. It is 
general in its terms; has usually been 
applied to disputes over property taxes and 
is found in the "miscellaneous" provisions of 
the tax code. On the other hand, Sees. 59-
15-12 to 15, upon which the Tax Commission 
relies, are of more recent origin, being part 
of the Sales Tax Act itself, which was 
enacted in 1933; and are explicit as to the 
manner in which a taxpayer dissatisfied with 
a sales tax assessment may challenge it. 
Id., at 551 (footnotes omitted). The Court found that only by 
electing an administrative remedy could the statutory 
interpretation of the Tax Commission be challenged. Id., at 551. 
The Court refused to allow the taxpayer to use the administrative 
remedy in the District Court. Id. 
Pursuant to the analysis of Pacific Intermountain, 
relief under § 59-10-529 is only available in the administrative 
setting. Plaintiffs below sought relief in District Court. This 
Court cannot accept Plaintiffs' reading of Pacific Intermountain. 
It must conclude that Plaintiffs have elected to proceed in 
District Court and cannot expand the class definition with a 
purely administrative remedy that is unavailable in that forum. 
Only Plaintiffs paying their taxes under protest and bringing 
suit in District Court within six months can properly challenge 
the legality or constitutionality of the exemption. 
This is made clear by the election of remedies 
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provision found in § 59-10-531 (1987): 
(1) Any taxpayer claiming to be entitled to 
a refund or credit under the provisions of § 
59-10-529 ["overpayment" statute! may file a 
claim for the refund or credit with the 
commission within the time provided in that 
section* 
(2) No claim may be filed for refund or 
credit on any tax for which the taxpayer has 
sought judicial review. 
(Empha sis added.) 
As subsection (1) makes clear, this statute, § 59-10-
531, applies to the "overpayment" provision of § 59-10-529. 
Subsection (2) provides that no refund or credit is available 
under § 59-10-529 ("overpayment") if a taxpayer has sought 
judicial review by electing to proceed in District Court. This 
statute restricts the District Court from exercising jurisdiction 
over a taxpayer seeking relief from an "over-payment." Utah 
District Courts have jurisdiction over all matters except as 
limited by the Constitution or statute. See Utah Const. Art. 
VIII § 5 (1991); see also State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1039 
(Utah 1941). The Tax Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over 
income tax matters except in a limited number of circumstances. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 (1987) ("[T]he commission shall 
administer and enforce the tax" imposed in the Individual Income 
Tax Act.) Only one of those exceptions applies in this case — 
Plaintiffs paying taxes under protest and bringing suit in 
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District Court for tax year 1988.9 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Utah State 
Legislature specifically provided for a three year limitations 
period when it adopted House Bill 373 in February of 1990. They 
contend that this bill "had the express purpose of extending the 
three year limit for claims under § 59-10-529(7) . . . ." 
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 44.) 
This contention is flawed for two reasons. First, it 
fails to recognize § 59-10-529 as the administrative remedy. The 
argument assumes as its basic premise that § 59-10-529 applies in 
District Court. Second, it ignores the expressed legislative 
declaration of purpose: "This act addresses only questions of 
access to the refund adjudication process caused by the timing of 
the Davis v. Michigan decision. It does not affect the merits of 
any pending or future refund litigation." 1990 Utah Laws ch. 21 
§ 2 (emphasis added). This legislation granted Plaintiffs the 
opportunity to have their claims for 19 85 examined at the Tax 
Commission in spite of the twenty day window between the 
announcement of Davis and the filing date. The legislature made 
no statement about whether Plaintiffs' claim for refund of an 
allegedly illegal tax is barred by a six month statute of 
limitations. The Legislature made no promises about the outcome 
of the action and expressly reserved all defenses. 
9
 See infra pp. 29-31 for the three types of income tax 
matters over which the District Court has jurisdiction. 
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The class as defined is overbroad. Only individuals 
paying their taxes under protest and bringing an action in 
District Court within six months can be included in it. The 
record supports a finding that some class members paid their 1988 
taxes under protest, and brought suit for refund, and are 
properly before the District Court. All others must be excluded 
from the class. The District Court must be reversed. 
B« Military Retirees Were Improperly Included Within 
the Class Because the Rule in Davis Does Not Apply 
to Them. 
As set forth in Defendants' Opening Brief at 28-30, 
military retirees should not have been included within the class 
definition. This argument was supported by federal case law. 
State supreme courts are split on this issue. See Barker v. 
Kansas, 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991) (federal military retirees are 
denied refunds in Davis litigation). Contra Kuhn v. Dept. of 
Revenue, 817 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1991); Pledger v. Bosnick, 811 
S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1991). This issue is now pending before the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Barker v. Kansas, 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991), 
cert, granted, 112 S.Ct. 576 (1991). 
Plaintiffs have made no effort to distinguish the 
rationale that underlies the federal cases cited in Defendants' 
Opening Brief. Instead, they claim "[i]t is clear Congress, in 
passing the USFSPA [Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act], viewed military retirement pay as exactly that, retirement 
pay, and not reduced pay for reduced services." (Plaintiffs' 
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Opening Brief at 89.) However, they fail to provide any 
legislative history in support of this assertion. Nor do they 
cite case law supporting clear congressional intent. 
Plaintiffs argue that USFSPA overrules the proposition 
that military pay is reduced pay for reduced services. However, 
§ 1408(c)(1) (1983) provides: 
A court may treat disposable retired or 
retainer pay payable to a member for pay 
periods beginning after January 25, 1991, 
either as property solely of the member or as 
property of the member and his spouse in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction 
of such court. 
This supports a finding that this statute allows a state the 
opportunity to decide how it will treat marital assets in a 
divorce proceeding. It fails to state how military benefits 
should be treated outside of divorce proceedings. This Court 
should consider the case law and reasoning presented in 
Defendants' Opening Brief. It establishes that military retirees 
receive reduced pay for reduced services. Consequently, the 
Davis decision does not apply to them as no comparable class of 
retirees from the State of Utah received reduced pay for reduced 
services. The District Court's inclusion of military retirees in 
the class definition should be reversed. 
C. The Class Definition is Overbroad Because 
Plaintiffs Have Admitted They Can Not Prevail 
Under Any Theory For the 1984 Year. 
Plaintiffs argue: "[t]hough initially included in the 
class, 1984 taxpayers have no valid claim to a refund and were 
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excluded from the final class definition." (Plaintiffs' Opening 
Brief at 84.) They cite to the final order. However, the 
portion of the order referenced is the statement of facts. This 
fails to redefine the class. Consequently, the order defining 
the class should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
A. The District Court Erred in Determining that the 
Tax Commission had Rendered a Final Decision When 
Only the Auditing Division had Examined the Issues 
Raised in Davis. 
Defendants moved to dismiss arguing that Plaintiffs had 
not exhausted administrative remedies. This request was denied. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Commission's position on granting 
refunds was clear. (See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 66, 76.) 
However, the Utah Individual Income Tax Act Provides: 
The commission's action on a claim for refund 
is final 90 days after the date of mailing of 
the commission's notice of agency action for 
taxpayers within the state, or 150 days after 
the mailing of the commission's notice of 
agency action for taxpayers outside the 
states of the union and the District of 
Columbia, unless the taxpayer files a 
petition for redetermination of the action 
with the commission before the expiration of 
those periods. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-532 (1987) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the Commission's action could not be final because 
taxpayers had actions pending before it. There could be no final 
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determination of the applicability of Davis prior to final agency 
action by the Commission. 
B. Declaratory Judgment is a Remedy, Not a Grant of 
Jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under the declaratory judgment statute, (See 
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 67-70.) They contend that 
Defendants' reasoning that Declaratory Judgment is not 
jurisdictional is "circuitous." (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 68 
n.38. ) 
This Court in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Utah 1983) (emphasis added) reasoned: 
The statutory creation of relief in the form 
of a declaratory judgment does not create a 
cause of action or grant jurisdiction to the 
court where it would not otherwise exist, 
the Utah Declaratory Judgment Statute merely 
authorizes a new form of relief, which in 
some cases will provide a fuller and more 
adequate remedy than that which existed under 
the common law. Gray v. Defaf 103 Utah 339, 
135 P.2d 251 (1943) . 
Accordingly, the District Court's independent basis for 
jurisdiction was for 1988 only. 
C. Before the District Court Could Rule that 
Plaintiffs Need Not Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies, It Must Have Had Jurisdiction to Hear 
the Case. 
The Utah Constitution gives the Tax Commission 
authority to supervise and administer the tax laws of the state. 
See Utah Const. Art. XIII § 11. The Utah Supreme Court has also 
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found: "The [tax] commission has general supervision over the tax 
laws of the state . . . ." Board of Equalization of Kane County 
v. Tax Comm'n, 50 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1935); see also Baker v. 
Tax Comm'n, 520 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1974) (plurality opinion 
cites Board of Equalization of Kane County v. Tax Comm'n with 
approval). The Legislature has also granted identical 
supervisory and administrative authority to the Tax Commission. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(5) (1987). Utah District Courts 
have jurisdiction "except as limited by [the] constitution or by 
statute . . . ." Utah Const. Art. VIII § 5 (1991). The Utah 
Supreme Court has declared: "[T]he legislature may define and 
prescribe the forum in which actions may or must be commenced . . 
. ." State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Utah 1941). 
Accordingly, the Legislature properly granted jurisdiction to the 
Tax Commission over income tax matters. 
The Utah State Individual Income Tax Act provides: 
"The commission shall administer and enforce the tax herein 
imposed . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 (1987). 
Consequently, the Legislature has granted jurisdiction to the 
State Tax Commission to administer and enforce all laws dealing 
with state income tax. 
The District Court has jurisdiction over only three 
types of income tax cases: 
1. Petitions for Writ of Mandate may be brought in 
District Court to compel a taxpayer to file individual income tax 
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returns. Utah Code Ann- § 59-1-707 (1987). 
2. The Tax Division of the District Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over Tax Commission decisions rendered in 
informal proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1)(b) (1987). 
3. District Court has jurisdiction for taxes alleged 
to be illegal and paid under protest.10 Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
301 (1987). 
None of these jurisdictional provisions are applicable 
in this case except for 1988 taxes paid under protest. 
Consequently, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
refund claims brought under the "overpayment" statute. 
D. The District Court Could Not Have Issued a Writ of 
Mandamus Requiring Plaintiffs to Act Where an 
Injunction was in Place Barring Them from Acting. 
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to a petition for writ of mandamus. (See 
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 70.) A writ of mandamus does not 
grant the court jurisdiction where it does not exist. Cf. 
Terracor v. Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986) 
(Mandamus cannot issue if a party lacks standing.) 
There is nothing in the record showing Plaintiffs ever 
10
 Where a party challenges the legality or the 
constitutionality of a statute, the exclusive remedy is "payment 
under protest in compliance with" statutory procedures. See Shea 
v. Tax Comm'n, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1941). Unless these 
procedures are followed, the taxpayer must seek an administrative 
remedy and seek review by the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1991 & 1987). 
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petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus. However, even if 
they had petitioned for mandamus, it is unjustified in this case. 
A writ of mandamus is only appropriate where an 
inferior tribunal has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion." Dorge v. Court of Appeals, 762 P.2d 347 (Utah 
1988). The Commission did neither. First, it was enjoined by 
the District Court prior to ever being able to act. (R. 267.) 
The general rule is: 
Since the appropriate function of mandamus is 
to compel the performance of duties imposed 
upon the respondent by law, and not to coerce 
acts which the law prohibits, it would seem 
that the relief ought not to be granted to 
enforce the doing of an act which has been 
expressly forbidden by injunction . . . 
State v. Shipton, 286 P.2d 601, 602 (Wyo. 1955) (Quoting, 34 
Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 77). 
Second, it cannot be argued that the Commission abused 
its discretion where there was no clear legal requirement for 
issuing tax refunds. In order to issue a writ of mandamus, the 
law must not only authorize the demanded action but require it; 
and the duty must be clear and undisputable. LeBeau v. State, 
377 P.2d 302 (Wyo. 1963). There was no clear requirement to 
issue refunds. Consequently, the District Court was without 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus. 
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POINT V 
FEES AND COSTS WERE INCORRECTLY AWARDED. 
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to fees and a 
costs under two theories. Their first theory is that damages are 
proper under a § 1983 civil rights claim. That claim was 
dismissed and the correctness of that decision is addressed at 
Point VI. Second, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court issued a 
writ of mandamus, and as a result of that order costs and 
attorneys fees are properly assessed. As discussed above, there 
is no basis for mandamus. Therefore, fees and costs were 
improperly awarded. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
THE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM. 
Introduction 
In reviewing a dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 12 
(b)(6), this Court accepts the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and considers all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 
(Utah 1991). A motion to dismiss is appropriate where it is 
clear that the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under 
the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to 
support their claim. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 
622, 624 (Utah 1990) . 
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The District Court was correct in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs' allegations of illegal 
exaction and retention of taxes are legal conclusions, not facts. 
A cause of action under § 1983 is viable only if the Defendants' 
reliance on existing law was unreasonable and violated clearly 
established statutory or Constitutional rights. Because right to 
refunds for any year had been established at the time Plaintiffs' 
brought their claims, Defendants' actions were not in violation 
of "a clearly established right of which a reasonable person 
would have known." Thus, a viable § 1983 claim cannot be 
supported. 
The State and the Tax Commission are not "persons" 
under the language of § 1983 and therefore are not subject to a § 
1983 claim for damages in state court. 
Plaintiffs' allegations of individual liability against 
the Tax Commissioners and the Commission Director are really 
official capacity claims. All allegations of wrongdoing here are 
related to each Defendant's office because Plaintiffs claim they 
reasonably relied on the public statements of individual Tax 
Commission members. There is no claim that the State officials 
acted for their own benefit outside their official capacities. 
Even if this is an individual capacity claim, the 
individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 
Defendants' conduct did not violate clearly established rights. 
A right to refunds was not clearly established at the time. 
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Thus, Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to 
qualified immunity- The District Court correctly dismissed the § 
1983 claim on immunity grounds. 
A. Plaintiffs' Allegations Fail to Support a § 1983 
Claim on Which Relief can be Granted. 
Plaintiffs' complaint attempts to characterize as 
"factual allegations" what really are Plaintiffs' legal 
conclusions. Plaintiffs allegations of illegal exaction and 
retention of taxes are legal conclusions, not facts. At the time 
the complaint was filed, no clear right to refunds existed. It 
is axiomatic that where no clear right existed, Defendants could 
not have knowingly violated such a right. Thus, no viable § 19 8 3 
cause of action exists. 
Plaintiffs assert their § 1983 claim based upon an 
alleged violation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 111 and the U.S. 
Constitution because of the preferential treatment given to state 
retirees. Utah's taxation scheme had existed for many years and 
was presumptively valid. See State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 
(Utah App. 1990); see also Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 
(Utah 1974) (Legislative enactments are presumed valid). 
The statutes and rules applicable to tax assessment and 
collection for tax years 1985 through 1988 were fixed on December 
31st at the close of each tax year. At the close of these tax 
years, two things were clear: (1) The taxation of federal 
retirees was lawful; and (2) Utah's tax statutes exempting state 
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retirees while taxing all others was permissible. The State's 
reliance on long established and unchallenged state law was 
reasonable. At the time the actions complained of took place, 
they were lawful. 
A cause of action under § 1983 is viable only if the 
State's reliance on existing law was unreasonable and violated 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.11 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The State's 
actions do not provide the basis for a § 1983 claim. 
B. The State and its Agencies are Entitled to 
Sovereign Immunity, and State Officials in Their 
Official Capacities are Immune from Damages Under 
§ 1983. 
The Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, (1989), held that a state is not a 
"person" under § 1983 and is not subject to a state court claim 
for damages in a § 1983 action. Jld. at 63. A state is granted 
sovereign immunity in its own courts. JTd.. at 69. Thus, under 
Will/ Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against the State and the State 
Tax Commission was properly dismissed. 
The Will Court further found that a suit against state 
11
 4 U.S.C. § 111 creates no enforceable rights under § 1983 
because intergovernmental immunity claims are not "rights, 
privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983. See 
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S. 
Ct. 766 (1987). The statute "being grounded not on individual 
rights but instead on considerations of power — will not support 
an action under § 1983." Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 
F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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officials in their official capacities is really a suit against 
the officials' offices and is no different from a suit against 
the state itself- JEd. at 71. Accordingly, the § 1983 claim 
against the Tax Commissioners and Director in their official 
capacities was properly dismissed on sovereign immunity 
grounds .12 
Plaintiffs cite Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S.Ct. 865 
(1991), which provides a § 1983 cause of action against state 
taxing officials for injunctive and declaratory relief for clear 
violations of the Commerce Clause, However, Dennis does not 
authorize a damages remedy. Moreover, Dennis does not overrule 
the immunity doctrines discussed above. Dennis only provided for 
a § 1983 claim for violations of the Commerce Clause. 
Plaintiffs argue, in a partial quote from Justice 
Kennedy's dissent (without identifying it as such), that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to sue for monetary damages here under § 
1983. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 94.) Dennis is not so far 
reaching. The Dennis dissenters urge that the Court must 
"distinguish between those constitutional provisions which secure 
the rights of persons vis-a-vis the States, and those provisions 
which allocate power between the Federal and State Governments. 
The former secure rights within the meaning of § 1983, but the 
12
 Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991) recently clarified 
Will. Hafer limited Will's sovereign immunity holding where state 
officials are sued in their individual capacities. See Section D, 
infra, for discussion of Hafer's impact. 
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latter do not." JEd. at 873. According to the dissenters, 
intergovernmental tax immunity provided by 4 U.S.C § 111 and the 
U.S. Constitution is not a right protected by § 1983; rather, 
intergovernmental tax immunity is a classic example where the 
provisions are only intended to allocate power between the 
federal and state governments, i.e. allocation of tax authority. 
In fact, the dissent states that "[T]here is no textual or other 
support for holding that § 1983 imposes such far reaching 
l i a b i l i t i e s upon the S t a t e s . " JTcl. a t 879. 
Even if a § 1983 cause of action were to exist here, 
official capacity Defendants, under Will, are still immune from 
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for monetary damages. The District 
Court was correct in dismissing the § 1983 claim on immunity 
grounds. 
C. Plaintiffs' Allegations of Individual Liability 
are Really Disguised Official Capacity Claims. 
Although Plaintiffs say the individual Defendants are 
named in this action as individuals, the Defendants are in 
reality being sued in their official capacities. An official 
capacity action is distinguished from an individual capacity 
lawsuit by the substance of the claim. Official capacity suits 
involve the policy or custom of a government entity. Kentucky v. 
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-167 (1985). In official capacity 
actions, the office of the individual defendant is related to the 
alleged improper conduct. Ld. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
-38-
Appeals explained the official capacity concept as follows: 
If the [plaintiff's] theory is that the 
defendant occupied a given office, and the 
occupant of the office had a duty (one 
attaching to any occupant of the office) to 
do such and such, then we have an "official 
capacity" suit . . . . If the theory is that 
the defendant did something that is tortious 
[sic] independent of the office the defendant 
holds, we have an "individual capacity" suit. 
Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1986). 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs state in the Amended 
Complaint that the individual Defendants are being sued as 
individuals. However, this unsupported characterization does not 
dispose of the question. The substance of the claim is 
determinative, and the Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate that 
the individuals are sued in their official capacities. 
The Graham and Walker courts held that an official 
capacity suit alleges misconduct related to a Defendant's office 
and to policy issuing therefrom. In this case, Plaintiffs have 
done just that. The Amended Complaint states that the individual 
Defendants have taken an illegal position concerning the taxation 
of federal pensions and have misrepresented the law on such tax. 
(Amended Complaint, paragraphs 15-18, 29-32, 45-47.) These are 
official capacity acts because they involve statements of Utah 
Tax Commission policy. Moreover, the acts are related to each 
Defendant's office because Plaintiffs claim they reasonably 
relied on the public statements of the individual Tax Commission 
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members. (JEd. at 45-47.) There is no allegation of an act 
independent of the individuals' offices, and no claim that the 
state officials acted for their own benefit outside their 
official capacities. This is an official capacity action, 
therefore, and was properly dismissed under the Will holding. 
D. If This is an Individual Capacity Case, the 
Individual Defendants are Entitled to Qualified 
Immunity with Respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 Claim 
for Monetary Damages. 
Defendants do not concede that this is a proper 
individual capacity case. However, even if it is, the individual 
Defendants have qualified immunity. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 
358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), cited by Plaintiffs, recently 
clarified the official and individual capacity dichotomy. Hafer 
was a "capacity" case; it was not a qualified immunity case. 
Hafer merely said that a defendant cannot convert a valid 
individual capacity suit to an official capacity suit. The Court 
granted certiorari to "address the question whether state 
officers may be held personally liable for damages under § 1983 
based upon actions taken in official capacities." JEd. at 361. 
The court said: 
Summarizing our holding, [in Willi we said: 
"[N]either a State nor its officials acting 
in their official capacities are 'persons' 
under § 1983." 
. . . 
State officers sued for damages in their 
official capacity are not "persons" for 
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purposes of the suit because they assume the 
identity of the government that employs them. 
Ibid, By contrast, officers sued in their 
personal capacity come to court as 
individuals. A government official in the 
role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits 
comfortably within the statutory term 
"person." 
Id. at 362. Although state officers in their individual 
capacities are subject to a § 1983 monetary relief claim, the 
Court made clear that qualified personal immunity may still 
attach to those individuals: 
While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity 
suit need not establish a connection to 
governmental "policy or custom," officials 
sued in their personal capacities, unlike 
those sued in their official capacities, may 
assert personal immunity defenses such as 
objectively reasonable reliance on existing 
law. 
Id. at 362, (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
Government officials who reasonably rely on existing 
law while performing discretionary functions are immune if their 
conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "A 
plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or 
statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified 
immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly 
established at the time of the conduct at issue." Davis v. 
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1226 
(1984) . 
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The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the Harlow 
standard and made it clear that not only the right but also the 
unlawfulness of the official's conduct in light of that right 
must be clearly established to overcome qualified immunity. 
The contours of the right [allegedly 
violated] must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right. This 
is not to say that an official action is 
protected by qualified immunity unless the 
very action in question has previously been 
held unlawful . . . but it is to say that in 
the light of the preexisting law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citations 
omitted). Reasonable grounds existed for Defendants' actions. 
The plain language of 4 U.S.C. § 111 was not such that tax 
officials would have known that Utah's disparate tax treatment of 
state and federal pensions violated the law. Even the Justices 
of the Supreme Court could not agree that the right defined in 
Davis was clearly established before Davis. It would be 
inappropriate to expect the individual Defendants to have such 
discernment. Further, because Davis did not mandate refunds, 
Defendants failure to sua sponte issue refunds after March 28, 
1989 cannot be characterized as action "that had previously been 
held unlawful." JEd. Many state court decisions on the Davis 
issue have different outcomes. Tax refund claims based upon 
retroactive application of Davis are not a clearly established 
right. Accordingly, the individual Defendants have qualified 
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immunity. 
Faced with similar facts and the same question 
presented here, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Swanson v. 
Powers, 937 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 
3475 (January 13, 1992), held that because the law was not 
clearly established when Davis was decided, the State Revenue 
Secretary was entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 
1983 for pre and post-Davis actions. I(i. at 966. The court 
reasoned that although public officials are "charged with 
knowledge of constitutional developments, [they] are not required 
to predict the future course of constitutional law." Id,, at 968 
(quoting Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
Powers' good faith adherence to the state's procedural statutes 
regarding refunds, and reliance on the advice of North Carolina's 
Attorney General entitled her to immunity for pre and post-Davis 
tax collection. jrd. at 971-973. (See also Duffy v. Wetzler, No. 
90-07800 (N.Y. App. Div., January 15, 1992) (qualified immunity 
provided a basis for rejecting § 1983 claims); see also Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 207-09 (1973) (except under extraordinary 
circumstances, liability will not attach for executing the 
statutory duties one was appointed to perform). 
The individual Defendants in this case are likewise 
entitled to qualified immunity from liability for pre and post-
Davis actions. Like the Defendants in Swanson and Dufjfy, the Tax 
Commissioners and Director reasonably relied upon existing law. 
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The outcome of Davis was not clearly foreshadowed, and the issue 
of refunds was not addressed by the Davis Court. Plaintiffs' 
asserted right to refunds was not clearly established at the time 
they filed their complaint. Thus, the Defendants' conduct did 
not contravene clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights. The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and 
the District Court's dismissal of § 1983 claims should be upheld. 
E. Dismissal of § 1983 Claims Should be Sustained Due 
to Plaintiffs' Failure to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. 
Plaintiffs' refusal to allow the Commission to 
adjudicate refund claims and possibly afford the relief sought by 
some Plaintiffs under § 59-10-529 should preclude the § 1983 
claims in District Court. Plaintiffs who were successful in 
enjoining the State from proceeding administratively with refund 
claims should not be allowed to shortcut exhaustion requirements 
and thereafter prosecute a § 1983 claim, which is essentially a 
refund claim under another name, against those whom they have 
enjoined. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in its post-Davis decision, 
Nutbrown v. Munn, 811 P.2d 131 (Or. 1991) cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 
867 (1992), held that § 1983 claims against state tax officials 
in their individual capacities were properly dismissed based on 
the taxpayers' failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. 
Id. at 143. The court rejected taxpayers' argument that 
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administrative remedies were inadequate and futile. The court 
said: 
If Taxpayers exhaust their administrative 
remedies and, in the process, obtain the 
relief under the Oregon personal income tax 
laws that they seek, the need for this § 19 83 
litigation vanishes. That is a sufficient 
reason to require exhaustion. 
Id., at 142-143 (footnote omitted). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently addressed this 
same issue. In Hogan v. Musolf, 471 N.W.2d 216, 217 (Wis. 1991), 
cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 867 (1992) the court held that taxpayers 
were required to exhaust administrative remedies before 
commencing a § 1983 action, and noted that its holding was 
consistent with other states' views. The court said: 
[T]he retirees' inability to obtain damages 
from the defendants in their individual 
capacities does not make the exhaustion 
requirement futile. The damages claimed 
against the defendants in their individual 
capacities are essentially a refund claim 
under a different name. The state's refund 
procedure adequately addresses these claims. 
Until that remedy is exhausted, "damages" are 
irrelevant. The defendants should, as 
McNary, 454 U.S. at 114, 102 S.Ct. at 185, 
suggests, be permitted to "rectify any 
alleged impropriety" through the state's 
procedure. 
Id. at 224 (emphasis added). 
Here, as in Oregon and Wisconsin, Plaintiffs sought to 
avoid administrative procedures. In this case, Plaintiffs were 
successful in enjoining the Defendants from making determinations 
on claims for refund. (R. 367.) Yet, Plaintiffs' claim for § 
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1983 damages is essentially a refund claim under another name.13 
The Defendants should be permitted to rectify any alleged 
impropriety before suffering a § 1983 state court action. 
Therefore, consistent with the Nutbrown and Hogan reasoning, 
Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies supports 
dismissal of their § 1983 claim. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
This Court should enter an order as follows: 
1. The Class should be redefined to include only 
Plaintiffs who have followed the procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-301 (1987). It is the remedy for alleged illegal taxes. 
Only those Plaintiffs making payment of taxes under protest and 
suing in District Court within six months are properly before the 
13
 But for the injunction, Defendants would have adjudicated 
the refund claims. In their "quasi-judicial" capacity, the 
individual Defendants would have been absolutely immune from § 1983 
damages liability. The Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 
478, 514 (1978) granted absolute immunity to officials performing 
adjudicatory functions within an agency. While qualified immunity 
from liability for damages is the general rule applicable to 
executive department officials, there are certain functions 
perfprmed by such officials that require complete, absolute 
immunity. Administrative adjudication shares enough of the 
characteristics of the judicial process that participants are given 
absolute immunity from suits for damages. Jd. at 513. (See also, 
Horwitz v. Board of Medical Examiners of State of Colorado, 822 
F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987) 
(Absolute immunity which affords complete protection from liability 
for damages, defeats suit at outset.) Plaintiffs should not be 
allowed to circumvent well founded judicial policy affording 
Defendants absolute immunity because they succeeded in enjoining 
Defendants from adjudicating refund claims. 
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District Court. The record supports a finding that some 
Plaintiffs paid their 1988 taxes under protest and brought suit 
within the prescribed time. The class should be limited to those 
persons. 
2. The rule in Davis does not apply to federal 
military retirees. Because military retirement pay is current 
compensation, it is fundamentally different from the pensions 
which were exempt from Utah income tax. There was no comparable 
class of state retirees who received current pay for reduced 
services. They should be excluded from the class definition. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529 is an administrative 
remedy. It is not applicable in this case. It is unavailable in 
the District Court. 
4. The Chevron retroactivity doctrine governs this 
case. Davis is a new rule of law; therefore, pursuant to 
American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2336 (1990) 
(Plurality Opinion), "prospective application of a new rule of 
law begins on the date of the decision announcing the principle." 
That date is March 28, 1989. Because tax liability for 1988 was 
fixed on December 31, 1988, the rule in Davis does not apply to 
the 1988 tax year or prior years. The Legislature made the Davis 
rule fully operative for tax year 1989. 
5. The District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Plaintiffs' Complaint attempted to 
characterize as factual allegations what in reality were legal 
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conclusions. No right to income tax refunds existed. The Tax 
Commission, the State, and Tax Commission Officers are entitled 
to sovereign immunity in their official capacities and to 
qualified immunity in their individual capacities. 
6. Fees and costs were incorrectly awarded. First, 
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim was properly dismissed. Consequently § 
1983 provides no basis for fees and costs. Second, Plaintiffs 
failed to petition the District Court for a writ of mandamus. 
Even if they had petitioned for the writ, it would be improper in 
this case. Consequently, the awarding of fees and costs was 
improper. 
If this Court determines that the rule of law in Davis 
applies for tax years 1985-1988, it should reverse the remedy 
crafted by the District Court. This Court should weigh heavily 
the benefit that State retirees received prior to Davis. State 
retirees received 8.3 million dollars in tax exemptions for tax 
years 1985-1988. Any relief granted Plaintiffs should be based 
on this amount received by state retirees for the same period. 
OtA/ 
Respectfully submitted this } ' day of March, 1992. 
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Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 1 
JAMKS H. IlKAM DISTi 
Cite MI H i S.< 
than report without them? Third, the 
Court suggests that misquotations that do 
not materially alter the meaning inflict no 
injury to reputation that is compensable as 
defamation. Ante, at 2433. This may be 
true, but this is a question of defamation or 
not, and has nothing to do with whether 
the author deliberately put within quota-
tion marks and attributed to the speaker 
words that the author knew the speaker 
did not utter. 
As I see it, the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment based on lack of malice 
should not have been granted on any of the 
six quotations considered by the Court in 
Part III-B of its opinion. I therefore dis-
sent from the result reached with respect 
to the "It Sounded Better" quotation dealt 
with in paragraph (c) of Part i l l -B , but 
agree with the Court's judgment on the 
other five misquotations. 
/Z\ 
( O \ I tTMUMfi lTsYSMM/ 
JAMKS B. BEAM DISTILLING 
COMPANY, Petitioner 
v. 
GEORGIA et al. 
No. 89-680. 
Argued Oct. 30, 191)0. 
Decided June 20, 1<J*J1. 
Distiller brought action to recover $2.4 
million in excise taxes that had been paid 
under Georgia excise tax statute that im-
posed greater tax on imported alcoholic 
beverages than was imposed on liquor man-
ufactured from Georgia-grown products. 
The Fulton Superior Court, Ralph H. Hicks, 
J., determined that statute violated com-
merce clause but that its ruling would only 
LLING CO. v. GEORGIA 2 4 3 9 
A. 2439 ( m i ) 
be applied prospectively, and distiller ap-
pealed. The Georgia Supreme Court, 259 
Ga. 3o3, 382 S.E.2d Mt affirmed, and distill-
er petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme 
Court, Justice Souter, held that prior ruling 
invalidating similar Hawaii tax scheme a|>-
plied retroactively to present claim arising 
out of facts antedating that decision. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice White filed decision concurring 
in judgment. 
Justice Blackmun filed opinion concur-
ring in judgment, in which Justices Mar-
shall and Scalia joined. 
Justice Scalia filed opinion concurring 
in judgment in which Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun joined. 
Justice O'Connor filed dissenting opin-
ion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Kennedy joined. 
1. Courts <e=>100(l) 
When Supreme Court has applied rule 
of law to litigants in one case it must do 80 
with respect to all others not barred by 
procedural requirements or res judicata. 
(Per Souter, J., with one Justice concurring 
and four Justices concurring in judgment.) 
2. Court* G=> 100(1) 
Supreme Court's decision in Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, that Hawaii statute 
imposing greater excise tax on imported 
alcoholic products than was imposed on 
local alcoholic products violated commerce 
clause, applied retroactively to similar 
Georgia excise tax statute being challenged 
in action arising out of facts antedating 
that decision. (Per Souter, J., with one 
Justice concurring and four Justices con-
curring in judgment.) O.C.G.A. § 3-4-60; 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
Syllabus 
Before 1985, Georgia law imposed an 
excise tax on imj>orted liquor at a rate 
•The syllabus constitutes no pan ol ihe opinion 
of the Court but has been prcpatcd by the He 
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
reader. Sec Untied Stales v. ItetroU Lumber Co.. 
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double that imposed on liquor manufac-
tured from Georgia-grown products. In 
1984, this Court, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 
L.Ed.2d 200, held that a similar Hawaii law 
violated the Commerce Clause. Petitioner, 
a manufacturer of Kentucky Bourbon, 
thereafter filed an action in Georgia state 
court, seeking a refund of taxes it paid 
under Georgia's law for 1982, 1983, and 
1984. The court declared the statute un-
constitutional, but refused to apply its rul-
ing retroactively, relying on Chevron Oil 
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 
L.Ed.2d 296, which held that a decision will 
be applied prospectively where it displaces 
a principle of law on which reliance may 
reasonably have been placed, and where 
prospectivity is on balance warranted by its 
effect on the operation of the new rule and 
by the inequities that might otherwise re-
sult from retroactive application. The 
State Supreme Court affirmed. 
Held: The judgment is reversed, and 
the case is remanded. 
259 Ga. 363, 382 S.E.2d 95 (Ga.1989), 
reversed and remanded. 
Justice SOUTER, joined by Justice 
STEVENS, concluded that once this Court 
has applied a rule of law to the litigants in 
one case, it must do so with respect to all 
others not barred by procedural require-
ments or res judicata. Pp. 2442-2448. 
(a) Whether a new rule should apply 
retroactively is in the first instance a mat-
ter of choice of law, to which question 
there are three possible answers. The first 
and normal practice is to make a decision 
fully retroactive. Second, there is the 
purely prospective method of overruling, 
where the particular case is decided under 
the old law but announces the new, effec-
tive with respect to all conduct occurring 
after the date of that decision. Finally, the 
new rule could be applied in the case in 
which it is pronounced, but then return to 
the old one with respect to all others aris-
ing on facts predating the pronouncement. 
The possibility of such modified, or selec-
tive, prospectivity was abandoned in the 
criminal context in Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 
L.Ed.2d 649. Pp. 2442-2445. 
(b) Because Bacchus did not reserve 
the question, and remanded the case for 
consideration of remedial issues, it is prop-
erly understood to have followed the nor-
mal practice of applying its rule retroac-
tively to the litigants there before the 
Court. Pp. 2445-2446. 
(c) Because Bacchus thus applied its 
own rule, principles of equality and stare 
decisis require that it be applied to the 
litigants in this case. Griffith's equality 
principle, that similarly situated litigants 
should be treated the same, applies equally 
well in the civil context as in the criminal. 
Of course, retroactivity is limited by the 
need for finality, since equality for those 
whose claims have been adjudicated could 
only be purchased at the expense of the 
principle that there be an end of litigation. 
In contrast, parties, such as petitioner, who 
wait to litigate until after others have la-
bored to create a new rule, are merely 
asserting a right that is theirs in law, is not 
being applied on a prospective basis only, 
and is not otherwise barred by state proce-
dural requirements. Modified prospectivi-
ty rejected, a new rule may not be retroac-
tively applied to some litigants when it is 
not applied to others. This necessarily lim-
its the application of the Chevron Oil test, 
to the effect that it may not distinguish 
between litigants for choice-of-law pur-
poses on the particular equities of their 
claims to prospectivity. It is the nature of 
precedent that the substantive law will not 
shift and spring on such a basis. Pp. 2446-
2447. 
(d) This opinion does not speculate as 
to the bounds or propriety of pure pros-
pectivity. Nor does it determine the appro-
priate remedy in this case, since remedial 
issues were neither considered below nor 
argued to this Court. P. 2448. 
200 VS. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282. 287. 50 L.Ed. 499. 
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Justice WHITE concluded that, under 
any one of several suppositions, the opinion 
in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 408 U.S. 
263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200, may 
reasonably read to extend the benefits of 
the judgment in that case to Bacchus Im-
ports and that petitioner here should also 
have the benefit of Bacchus. If the Court 
in Bacchus thought that its decision was 
not a new rule, there would be no doubt 
that it would be retroactive to all similarly 
situated litigants. The Court in that case 
may also have thought that retroactivity 
was proper under the factors set forth in 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 
S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296. And, even if the 
Court was wrong in applying Bacchus 
retroactively, there is no precedent in civil 
cases for applying a new rule to the parties 
of the case but not to others. Moreover, 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 
107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, has 
overruled such a practice in criminal cases 
and should be followed on the basis of 
stare decisis. However, the propriety of 
pure prospectivity is settled in this Court's 
prior cases, see, e.g., Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 
1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647, which recognize that 
in proper cases a new rule announced by 
the Court will not be applied retroactively, 
even to the parties before the Court. To 
allow for the possibility of speculation as to 
the propriety of such prospectivity is to 
suggest that there may come a time when 
this Court's precedents on the issue will be 
overturned. Pp. 2448-2449. 
Justice BLACKMUN, joined by Justice 
MARSHALL and Justice SCALJA, conclud-
ed that prospectivity, whether "selective" 
or "pure," breaches the Court's obligation 
to discharge its constitutional function in 
articulating new rules for decision, which 
must comport with its duty to decide only 
cases and controversies. Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 
L.Ed.2d 649. The nature of judicial review 
constrains the Court to require retroactive 
application of each new rule announced. 
Pp. 2449-2450. 
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Justice SCALIA, joined by Justice 
MARSHALL and Justice BLACKMUN, 
while agreeing with Justice SOUTER's con-
clusion, disagreed that the issue is one of 
choice of law, and concluded that both se-
lective and pure prospectivity are impermis-
sible, not for reasons of equity, but be-
cause they are not permitted by the Consti-
tution. To allow the Judiciary powers 
greater than those conferred by the Consti-
tution, as the fundamental nature of those 
powers was understood when the Constitu-
tion was enacted, would upset the division 
of federal powers central to the constitu-
tional scheme. Pp. 2450-2451. 
SOUTER, J., announced the 
judgment of the Court, and delivered an 
opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined. 
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring 
in the judgment BLACKMUN, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
in which MARSHALL and SCALIA, JJ., 
joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, in which 
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., 
joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which 
REHNQU1ST, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., 
joined. 
Morton Siegel, Chicago, III., for petition-
er. 
Amelia W. Baker, Atlanta, Ga., for re-
spondents. 
Justice SOUTER announced the judg-
ment of the Court, and delivered an opinion 
in which Justice STEVENS joins. 
The question presented is whether our 
ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd, v. Dias, 
468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 
(1984), should apply retroactively to claims 
arising on facts antedating that decision. 
We hold that application of the rule in that 
case requires its application retroactively in 
later cases. 
m a u n t f . M K COURT REPORTER 
1 
Prior to its amendment in 1985, Georgia 
state law imposed an excise tax on import-
ed alcohol and distilled spirits at a rate 
double that imposed on alcohol and distilled 
spirits manufactured from Georgia-grown 
products. See Ga.Code Ann. § 3-4-f>0 
(1982). In 1984, a Hawaii statute that sim-
ilarly distinguished between imported and 
local alcoholic products was held in Bac-
chus to violate the Commerce Clause. 
Bacchus, supra, at 273, 104 S.Ct., at 3056. 
It proved no bar to our finding of unconsti-
tutionality that the discriminatory tax in-
volved intoxicating liquors, with respect to 
which the States have heightened regula-
tory powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. Id., at 276, 104 S.Ct., at 3057. 
In Bacchus' wake, petitioner, a Delaware 
corporation and Kentucky bourbon manu-
facturer, claimed Georgia's law likewise in-
consistent with the Commerce Clause, and 
sought a refund of $2.4 million, represent-
ing not only the differential taxation but 
the full amount it had paid under § 3-4-60 
for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Geor-
gia's Department of Revenue failed to re-
spond to the request, and Beam thereafter 
brought a refund action against the State 
in the Superior Court of Fulton County. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the trial court agreed that § 3-4-60 could 
not withstand a Bacchus attack for the 
years in question, and that the tax had 
therefore been unconstitutional. Using the 
analysis described in this Court's decision 
in Chevron Oil Co. r. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 
92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the 
court nonetheless refused to apply its rul-
ing retroactively. It therefore denied peti-
tioner's refund request. 
'The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed 
the trial court in both respects. The court 
held the pre-1985 version of the statute to 
have violated the Commerce Clause as, in 
its words, an act of "simple economic pro-
1. Although petitioner expends some effort, see 
Brief for Petitioner 5-8. in asserting the uncon-
stitutionality under Bacchus of the Georgia law 
as amended, see Ga.Code Ann. § 3-4-60 (1990). 
tectionism." See 259 Ga. 363, 3G4, 382 
S.E.2d 95, 9(i (1989) (citing Bacchus). But 
it, too, applied that finding on a prospective 
basis only, in the sense that it declined to 
declare the State's application of the stat-
ute unconstitutional for the years in ques-
tion. The court concluded that but for 
Bacchus its decision on the constitutional 
question would have established a new rule 
of law by overruling past precedent, see 
Scott v. State, 187 Ga. 702, 2 S.E.2d 65 
(1939) (upholding predecessor to § 3-4-60 
against Commerce Clause objection), upon 
which the litigants may justifiably have 
relied. See 259 Ga., at 365, 382 S.E.2d, at 
96. That reliance, together with the "un-
just results" that would follow from retro-
active application, was thought by the 
court to satisfy the Chevron Oil test for 
prospectivity. To the dissenting argument 
of two justices that a statute found uncon-
stitutional is unconstitutional ab initio, the 
court observed that while it had " 'declared 
statutes to be void from their inception 
when they were contrary to the Constitu-
tion at the time of enactment, . . . those 
decisions are not applicable to the present 
controversy, as the original . . . statute, 
when adopted, was not violative of the Con-
stitution under the court interpretations of 
that period/ " 259 Ga., at 366, 382 S.E.2d, 
at 97 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 249 Ga. 
477, 478-479, 291 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1982)). 
Beam sought a writ of certiorari from 
the Court on the retroactivity question.1 
We granted the petition, 496 U.S. , 110 
S.Ct. 2616, 110 L.Ed.2d 637 (1990), and now 
reverse. 
II 
In the ordinary case no question of re-
troactivity arises. Courts are as a general 
matter in the business of applying settled 
principles and precedents of law to the 
disputes that come to bar. See Mishkin, 
Foreword: The High Court, The Great 
an argument rejected by the Georgia Supreme 
Court in HeubUin, Inc. v. Slate, 256 Ga. 578, 351 
S.E.2d 190 (1987). that issue is neither before us 
nor relevant to the issue that is. 
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Writ, and the Due Process of Time and 
Law, 79 Harv.L.Iiev. 5(5, 60 (1965). Where 
those principles and precedents antedate 
the events on which the dispute turns, the 
court merely applies legal rules already 
decided, and the litigant has no basis on 
which to claim exemption from those rules. 
It is only when the law changes in some 
respect that an assertion of nonretroactivi-
ty may be entertained, the paradigm case 
arising when a court expressly overrules a 
precedent upon which the contest would 
otherwise be decided differently and by 
which the parties may previously have reg-
ulated their conduct. Since the question is 
whether the court should apply the old rule 
or the new one, retroactivity is properly 
seen in the first instance as a matter of 
choice of law, "a choice . . . between the 
principle of forward operation and that of 
relation backward." Great Northern R. 
Co. v, Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 
U.S. 358, 364, 53 S.Ct. 145, 148, 77 L.Ed. 
360 (1932). Once a rule is found to apply 
' 'backward," there may then be a further 
issue of remedies, i.e., whether the party 
prevailing under a new rule should obtain 
the same relief that would have been 
awarded if the rule had been an old one. 
Subject to possible constitutional thresh-
olds, see McKesson Corp. o. Florida Alco-
holic Beverages and Tobacco Div., 496 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 
(1990), the remedial inquiry is one governed 
by state law, at least where the case origi-
nates in state court. See American Truck-
ing Assiis., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. , 
, 110 S.Ct. 2323, , 110 L.Ed.2d 148 
(1990) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the 
antecedent choice-of-law question is a fed-
eral one where the rule at issue itself de-
rives from federal law, constitutional or 
otherwise. See Smith, supra, at , 110 
S.Ct., at (plurality opinion); cf. United 
States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 
297, n., 90 S.Ct. 1033, 1039, n., 25 L.Ed.2d 
312 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
As a matter purely of judicial mechanics, 
there are three ways in which the choice-of-
law problem may be resolved. First, a 
decision may be made fully retroactive, ap-
plying both to the parties before the court 
and to all others by and against whom 
claims may be pressed, consistent with res 
judicata and procedural barriers such as 
statutes of limitations. This practice is 
overwhelmingly the norm, see Kuhn v. 
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372, 30 
S.Ct. 140, 148, 54 L.Ed. 228 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting), and is in keeping with the tra-
ditional function of the courts to decide 
cases before them based upon their best 
current understanding of the law. See 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
679, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1173, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments 
in part and dissenting in part). It also 
reflects the declaratory theory of law, see 
Smith, supra, at , 110 S.Ct., at 
(1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judg-
ment); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 
622-623, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1733-1734, 14 
L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), according to which the 
courts are understood only to find the law, 
not to make it. But in some circumstances 
retroactive application may prompt difficul-
ties of a practical sort. However much it 
comports with our received notions of the 
judicial role, the practice has been attacked 
for its failure to take account of reliance on 
cases subsequently abandoned, a fact of 
life if not always one of jurisprudential 
recognition. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 
341 U.S. 267, 276, 71 S.Ct. 680, 684, 95 
L.Ed. 927 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). 
Second, there is the purely prospective 
method of overruling, under which a new 
rule is applied neither to the parties in the 
law-making decision nor to those others 
against or by whom it might be applied to 
conduct or events occurring before that 
decision. The case is decided under the old 
law but becomes a vehicle for announcing 
the new, effective with respect to all con-
duct occurring after the date of that deci-
sion. This Court has, albeit infrequently, 
resorted to pure prospectivity, see Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 
30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971); Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
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Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2880, 
73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 142-143, 96 S.Ct. 612, 693, 46 
L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); England v. Louisiana 
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 
411, 422, 84 S.Ct. 461, 468, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 
(1964); see also Smith, supra, at , n. 
11, 110 S.Ct., at 2354, n. 11 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting); Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S., at 
628, 85 S.Ct., at 1737, although in so doing 
it has never been required to distinguish 
the remedial from the choice-of-law aspect 
of its decision. See Smith, supra, at , 
110 S.Ct., at (STEVENS, J., dissent-
ing). This approach claims justification in 
its appreciation that "[t]he past cannot al-
ways be erased by a new judicial declara-
tion," Chicot County Drainage District v. 
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60 
S.Ct. 317, 318, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), see also 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199, 93 
S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (plu-
rality opinion), and that to apply the new 
rule to parties who relied on the old would 
offend basic notions of justice and fairness. 
But this equitable method has its own 
drawback: it tends to relax the force of 
precedent, by minimizing the costs of over-
ruling, and thereby allowfs the courts to act 
with a freedom comparable to that of legis-
latures. See United States v. Johnson, 
457 U.S. 537, 554-555, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2589-
2590, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); James v. 
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 225, 81 S.Ct. 
1052, 1058, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
Finally, a court may apply a new rule in 
the case in wrhich it is pronounced, then 
return to the old one with respect to all 
others arising on facts predating the pro-
nouncement. This method, which we may 
call modified, or selective, prospectivity, en-
joyed its temporary ascendancy in the crim-
inal law during a period in which the Court 
formulated new rules, prophylactic or oth-
erwise, to insure protection of the rights of 
the accused. See, e.g., Johtison v. New 
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 
L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 
L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Daniel v. Louisiana, 
420 U.S. 31, 95 S.Ct. 704, 42 L.Ed.2d 790 
(1975); see also Smith, supra, at , 110 
S.Ct., at ("During the period in which 
much of our retroactivity doctrine evolved, 
most of the Court's new rules of criminal 
procedure had expanded the protections 
available to criminal defendants"). On the 
one hand, full retroactive application of 
holdings such as those announced in Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct 
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 
L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); and Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), would have "seriously 
disrupted] the administration of our crimi-
nal laws[,] . . . requiring] the retrial or 
release of numerous prisoners found guilty 
by trustworthy evidence in conformity with 
previously announced constitutional stan-
dards." Johnson, supra, 384 U.S., at 731, 
86 S.Ct., at 1780. On the other hand, retro-
active application could hardly have been 
denied the litigant in the law-changing deci-
sion itself. A criminal defendant usually 
seeks one thing only on appeal, the rever-
sal of his conviction; future application 
would provide little in the way of solace. 
In this context, without retroactivity at 
least to the first successful litigant, the 
incentive to seek review would be diluted if 
not lost altogether. 
But selective prospectivity also breaches 
the principle that litigants in similar situa-
tions should be treated the same, a funda-
mental component of stare decisis and the 
rule of law generally. See R. Wasser-
strom. The Judicial Decision 69-72 (1961). 
44We depart from this basic judicial tradi-
tion when we simply pick and choose from 
among similarly situated defendants those 
who alone will receive the benefit of a 
'new' rule of constitutional law." Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-259, 89 
S.Ct. 1030, 1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Von Mos-
chzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last 
Resort, 37 Harv.LRev. 409, 425 (1924). 
For this reason, we abandoned the possibili-
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ty of selective prospectivity in the criminal 
context in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 U S 
314, 328, 107 S Ct 708, 716, 93 L Ed 2d 649 
(1987), even where the new rule constituted 
a "clear break" with previous law, in favor 
of completely retroactive application of all 
decisions to cases pending on direct review 
Though Griffith was held not to dispose of 
the matter of civil retroactivity, see id, at 
322, n 8, 107 S Ct , at 712, n 8, selective 
prospectivity appears never to have been 
endorsed in the civil context Smith, 496 
U S , at , 110 S Ct , at (plurality 
opinion) This case presents the issue 
III 
[1,2] Both parties have assumed the 
applicability of the Chevron Oil test, under 
which the Court has accepted prospectivity 
(whether in the choice-of-law or remedial 
sense, it is not clear) where a decision 
displaces a principle of law on which re 
hance may reasonably have been placed, 
and where prospectivity is on balance war 
ranted by its effect on the operation of the 
new rule and by the inequities that might 
otherwibe result from retroactive applica-
tion See Chevron Oil, 404 U S , at 106-
107, 92 S Ct , at 355 But we have never 
employed Cheiron Oil to the end of mod 
lfied civil prospectivity 
The issue is posed by the -scope of our 
disposition in Bacchus In most decisions 
of this Court, retroactivity both as to choice 
of law and as to remedy goes without the 
saying Although the taxpaying appellants 
prevailed on the merits of their Commerce 
Clause claim, however, the Bacchus Court 
did not grant outright their request for a 
refund of taxes paid under the law found 
unconstitutional Instead, we remanded 
the case for consideration of the State's 
arguments that appellants were "not enti-
tled to refunds since they did not bear the 
2 In fact the state defendant in Bacchus argued 
for pure prospectivity under the criteria set 
forth in Chevron Oil Co v Huson, 404 U S 97 
92 SCt 349 30 L t d 2d 296 (1971) See Brief 
for Appellee in Bacchus Import* Ltd v Dias, 
O T 1 9 8 3 No 82-1565 p 19 It went on to 
argue that 'even if" the challenged tax were 
economic incidence of the tax but passed it 
on as a separate addition to the price that 
their customers were legally obligated to 
pay " Bacchus, 468 U S , at 276-277, 104 
S Ct , at 3058 "These refund issues, . . 
essentially issues of remedy," had not been 
adequately developed on the record nor 
passed upon by the state courts below, and 
their consideration may have been inter-
twined with, or obviated by, matters of 
state law Id, at 277, 104 S Ct, at 3058 
Questions of remedy aside, Bacchus is 
fairly read to hold as a choice of law that 
its rule should apply retroactively to the 
litigants then before the Court Because 
the Bacchus opinion did not reserve the 
question whether its holding should be ap-
plied to the parties before it, compare 
American Trucking ASSJIS , Inc v Schem-
er, 483 U S 266, 297-298, 107 S Ct 2829, 
2847-2848, 97 L Ed 2d 220 (1987) (remand-
ing case to consider whether ruling "should 
be applied retroactively and to decide other 
remedial issues"), it is properly understood 
to have followed the normal rule of retroac-
tive application in civil cases If the Court 
were to have found prospectivity as a 
choice-of-law matter, there would have 
been no need to consider the pass-through 
defense, if the Court had reserved the 
issue, the terms of the remand to consider 
"remedial" issues would have been incom-
plete Indeed, any consideration of remedi-
al issues necessarily implies that the prece-
dential question has been settled to the 
effect that the rule of law will apply to the 
parties before the Court See McKesson, 
496 U S , at , 110 S Ct , at (pass-
through defense considered as remedial 
question) Because the Court in Bacchus 
remanded the case solely for consideration 
of the pass through defense, it thus should 
be read as having retroactively applied the 
rule there decided 2 See also Williams v 
held invalid and the decision were not limited 
to prospective application the challengers 
should not be entitled tu refunds because any 
taxes paid would have been passed through to 
consumers Id, at 46 Though unnecessary to 
our ruling heie the prospectivity issue can thus 
be said actually to have been litigated and by 
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Vermont, 472 U.S. 14. 28, 105 S.Ct. 2465, 
2474, 86 L.Ld.2d 11 (1985); Exxon Corp. v. 
Eagerton, 4(J2 U.S. 17(5. 11)6-197, 103 S.Ct. 
2290, 2308-2309, 70 L.Kd.2d 497 (1983); cf. 
Davis v. Michigan Dcpt. of Treasury, 489 
U.S. 803. 817. 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1508, 103 
L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). 
Bacchus thus applied its own rule, just 
as if it had reversed and remanded without 
further ado, and yet of course the Georgia 
courts refused to apply that rule with re-
spect to the litigants in this case. Thus, 
the question is whether it is error to refuse 
to apply a rule of federal law retroactively 
after the case announcing the rule has al-
ready done so. We hold that it is, princi-
ples of equality and stare decisis here pre-
vailing over any claim based on a Chevron 
Oil analysis. 
Griffith cannot be confined to the crimi-
nal law. Its equality principle, that similar-
ly situated litigants should be treated the 
same, carries comparable force in the civil 
context. See United States v. Estate of 
Donnelly, 397 U.S., at 290, 90 S.Ct, at 
1039 (Harlan, J., concurring). Its strength 
is in fact greater in the latter sphere. With 
respect to retroactivity in criminal cases, 
there remains even now the disparate treat-
ment of those cases that come to the Court 
directly and those that come here in collat-
eral proceedings. See Griffith, supra, 479 
U.S., at 331-332, 107 S.Ct, at 717-718 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Whereas Griffith 
held that new rules must apply retroac-
tively to all criminal cases pending on di-
rect review, we have since concluded that 
new rules will not relate back to convic-
tions challenged on habeas corpus. Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 
L.Ld.2d 334 (1989). No such difficulty ex-
ists in the civil arena, in which there is little 
opportunity for collateral attack of final 
judgments. 
Nor is selective pros {activity necessary 
to maiutain incentives to litigate in the civil 
context as it may have been in the criminal 
implication actually to have been decided by the 
Court by the fact of itb consideration of the 
pass-through defense. See CUmun* v. Musissip-
before Griffith 's rule of absolute retroac-
tivity. In the civil context, "even a party 
who is deprived of the full retroactive bene-
fit of a new decision may receive some 
relief." Smith, 490 U.S., at , 110 S.Ct, 
at . Had the petitioners in Bacchus 
lost their bid for retroactivity, for example, 
they would nonetheless have won protec-
tion from the future imposition of discrimi-
natory taxes, and the same goes for the 
petitioner here. Assuming that pure pros-
pectivity may be had at all, moreover, its 
scope must necessarily be limited to a small 
number of cases; its possibility is therefore 
unlikely to deter the broad class of prospec-
tive challengers of civil precedent. See 
generally Currier, Time and Change in 
Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 
51 Va.L.Rev. 201, 215 (1965). 
Of course, retroactivity in civil cases 
must be limited by the need for finality, see 
Chicot County Drainage District v. Bax-
ter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 
84 L.Ed. 329 (1940); once suit is barred by 
res judicata or by statutes of limitation or 
repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door 
already closed. It is true that one might 
deem the distinction arbitrary, just as some 
have done in the criminal context with re-
spect to the distinction between direct re-
view and habeas: why should someone 
whose failure has otherwise become final 
not enjoy the next day's new rule, from 
which victory would otherwise spring? It 
is also objected that in civil cases unlike 
criminal there is more potential for liti-
gants to freeioad on those without whose 
labor the new rule would never have come 
into being. (Criminal defendants are al-
ready potential litigants by virtue of their 
offense, and invoke retroactivity only by 
way of defense; civil beneficiaries of new 
rules may become litigants as a result of 
the law change alone, and use it as a weap-
on.) That is true of the petitioner now 
before us, which did not challenge the 
Georgia law until after its fellow liquor 
pi, 494 U.S. . . n. 3. 110 S.Ct. 1441. 1448. 
n. 3, 108 L.Bd.2d 725 (1990). 
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distributors had won their battle in Bac-
chus. To apply the rule of Bacchus to the 
parties in that case but not in this one 
would not, therefore, provoke Justice Har-
lan's attack on modified prospectivity as 
"(s]imply fishing one case from the stream 
of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for 
pronouncing new constitutional standards, 
and then permitting a stream of similar 
cases to flow by unaffected by that new 
rule." Mackey, 401 U.S., at G79, 91 S.Ct, 
at 1173 (Harlan, J., concurring in judg-
ments in part and dissenting in part), see 
also Smith, supra, at , 110 
S.Ct, at (STEVENS, J., dissent-
ing). Beam had yet to enter the waters at 
the time of our decision in Bacchus, and 
yet we give it Bacchus1 benefit Insofar as 
equality drives us, it might be argued that 
the new rule should be applied to those 
who had toiled and failed, but whose claims 
are now precluded by res judicata; and 
that it should not be applied to those who 
only exploit others' efforts by litigating in 
the new rule's wake. 
As to the former, independent interests 
are at stake; and with respect to the latter, 
the distinction would be too readily and 
unnecessarily overcome. While those 
whose claims have been adjudicated may 
seek equality, a second chance for them 
could only be purchased at the expense of 
another principle. " 'Public policy dictates 
that there be an end of litigation; that 
those who have contested an issue shall be 
bound by the result of that contest, and 
that matters once tried shall be considered 
forever settled as between the parties.' " 
Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S.Ct 2424, 2429, 69 
L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) (quoting Baldwin v. 
Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 
U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 518, 75 L.Ed. 
1244 (1931)). Finality must thus delimit 
equality in a temporal sense, and we must 
accept as a fact that the argument for 
uniformity loses force over time. As for 
the putative hangers-on, they are merely 
asserting a right that the Court has told 
them is theirs in law, that the Court has 
not deemed necessary to apply on a pro-
spective basis only, and that is not other-
wise barred by state procedural require-
ments. They cannot be characterized as 
freeloaders any more than those who seek 
vindication under a new rule on facts aris-
ing after the rule's announcement Those 
in each class rely on the labors of the first 
successful litigant. We might, of course, 
limit retroactive application to those who at 
least tried to fight their own battles by 
litigating before victory was certain. To 
this possibility, it is enough to say that 
distinguishing between those with cases 
pending and those without would only 
serve to encourage the filing of replicative 
suits when this or any other appellate court 
created the possibility of a new rule by 
taking a case for review. 
Nor, finally, are litigants to be distin-
guished for choice-of-law purposes on the 
particular equities of their claims to pros-
pectivity: whether they actually relied on 
the old rule and how they would suffer 
from retroactive application of the new. It 
is simply in the nature of precedent, as a 
necessary component of any system that 
aspires to fairness and equality, that the 
substantive law will not shift and spring on 
such a basis. To this extent, our decision 
here does limit the possible applications of 
the Chevron Oil analysis, however irrele-
vant Chevron Oil may otherwise be to this 
case. Because the rejection of modified 
prospectivity precludes retroactive applica-
tion of a new rule to some litigants when it 
is not applied to others, the Chevron Oil 
test cannot determine the choice of law by 
relying on the equities of the particular 
case. See Simpson v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, Unit-
ed States Dept. of Labor, 681 F.2d 81, 
85^86 (CA1 1982), cert, denied sub nom. 
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office 
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
United States Dept. of Labor, 459 U.S. 
1127, 103 S.Ct 7G2, 74 L.Ed.2d 977 (1983); 
see also Note, 1985 U.Iii.L.Rev. 117, 131-
132. Once retroactive application is chosen 
for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for 
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all others who might seek its prospective 
application. The applicability of rules of 
law are not to be switched on and off 
according to individual hardship; allowing 
relitigation of choice-of-law issues would 
only compound the challenge to the stabiliz-
ing purjKJse of precedent posed in the first 
instance by the very development of "new" 
rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry 
permits litigants to assert, and the courts 
to consider, the equitable and reliance in-
terests of parties absent but similarly situ-
ated. Conversely, nothing we say here pre-
cludes consideration of individual equities 
when deciding remedial issues in particular 
cases. 
IV 
The grounds for our decision today are 
narrow. They are confined entirely to an 
issue of choice of law: when the Court has 
applied a rule of law to the litigants in one 
case it must do so with respect to all others 
not barred by procedural requirements or 
res judicata. We do not speculate as to the 
bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity. 
Nor do we speculate about the remedy 
that may be appropriate in this case; reme-
dial issues were neither considered below 
nor argued to this Court, save for an effort 
by petitioner to buttress its claim by refer-
ence to our decision last Term in McKes-
son. As we have observed repeatedly, fed-
eral "issues of remedy . . . may well be 
intertwined with, or their consideration ob-
viated by, issues of state law." Bacchus, 
468 U.S., at 277, 104 S.Ct., at 3058. Noth-
ing we say here deprives respondent of his 
opportunity to raise procedural bars to re-
covery under state law or demonstrate re-
liance interests entitled to consideration in 
determining the nature of the remedy that 
must be provided, a matter with which 
McKesson did not deal. See Estate of 
Donnelly, 397 U.S., at 2%, 90 S.Ct., at 
* Sec Northern ft pelt ne Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co.. 458 U.S. 50, 88. 102 S.Ct. 
2858, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 142-143, 96 S.Ct. 612. 693. 46 
1039 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Lemon, 
411 U.S., at 203, 93 S.Ct., at 1471. 
The judgment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
// is su ordered. 
Justice WHITE, concurring in the 
judgment. 
1 agree with Justice SOUTER that the 
opinion in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diets, 
468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 
(1984), may reasonably be read as extend-
ing the benefit of the judgment in that case 
to the appellant Bacchus Imports. I also 
agree that the decision is to be applied to 
other litigants whose cases were not final 
at the time of the Bacchus decision. This 
would be true under any one of several 
suppositions. First, if the Court in that 
case thought its decision to have been rea-
sonably foreseeable and hence not a new 
rule, there would be no doubt that it would 
be retroactive to all similarly situated liti-
gants. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 
U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), 
would not then have been implicated. Sec-
ond, even if retroactivity depended upon 
consideration of the Chevron Oil factors, 
the Court may have thought that retroac-
tive application was proper. Here, it 
should be noted that although the dissen-
ters in Bacchus—including Justice 
O'CONNOR—agreed that the Court erred 
in deciding the Twenty-first Amendment 
issue against the State, they did not argue 
that the Court erred in giving the appellant 
the benefit of its decision. Bacchus, su-
pra, at 278, 104 S.Ct., at 3059 (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting). Third, even if—as Justice 
O'CONNOR now argues—the Court was 
quite wrong in doing so, post, at 2452-
2456, that is water over the dam, irretriev-
ably it seems to me. There being no prece-
dent in civil cases applying a new rule to 
the parties in the case but not to others 
similarly situated,* and Griffith v. Ken-
U:d.2d 659 (1976); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 
404 U.S. 97. 92 S.Ct. 349. 30 L.Kd.2d 296 (1971). 
Cipnano v. City of Uotana. 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 
S.Ct. 1897. 1900. 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969); Allen v. 
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tucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 
93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), having overruled 
such a practice in criminal cases (a decision 
from which I dissented and still believe 
wrong, but which I now follow on the basis 
of stare decisis ), I agree that the petition-
er here should have the benefit of Bacchus, 
just as Bacchus Imports did. Hence I con-
cur in the judgment of the Court. 
Nothing in the above, however, is meant 
to suggest that I retreat from those opin-
ions filed in this Court which I wrote or 
joined holding or recognizing that in proper 
cases a new rule announced by the Court 
will not be applied retroactively, even to 
the parties before the Court. See, e.g., 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 
706, 89 S.Ct 1897, 1900, 23 I,Ed.2d 647 
(1969). This was what Justice Stewart 
wrote for the Court in Chevron Oil sum-
marizing what was deemed to be the es-
sence of those cases. Chevron Oil, supra, 
at 105-109, 92 S.Ct., at 355-357. This was 
also what Justice O'CONNOR wrote for 
the plurality in American Trucking 
Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. , 110 
S.Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 1 joined 
that opinion and would not depart from it. 
Nor, without overruling Chevron Oil and 
those other cases before and after Chevron 
Oil, holding that certain decisions will be 
applied prospectively only, can anyone sen-
sibly insist on automatic retroactivity for 
any and all judicial decisions in the federal 
system. 
Hence, I do not understand how Justice 
SOUTER can cite the cases on prospective 
operation, ante, at 2443, and yet say that 
he need not speculate as to the propriety of 
pure prospectivity, ante, at 2448. The pro-
priety of prospective application of decision 
in this Court, in both Constitutional and 
statutory cases, is settled by our prior deci-
sions. To nevertheless "speculate" about 
the issue is only to suggest that there may 
Stale Bd. oj Elections. 393 U.S. 544, 572, 89 S Ct 
817, 835, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), Simpson v. Union 
Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24-25, 84 S Ct. 1051, 1058-
1059, 12 L.Ed.2d 98 (1964), England v. Louisi-
ana State Bd. of Medical Examiner*, 375 U.S 
come a time when our precedents on the 
issue will be overturned. 
Plainly enough, Justices SCALIA, 
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN would de-
part from our precedents. Justice SCALIA 
would do so for two reasons, as I read him. 
Post, at . First, even though the Jus-
tice is not naive enough (nor does he think 
the Framers were naive enough) to be un-
aware that judges in a real sense "make" 
law, he suggests that judges (in an unreal 
sense, I suppose) should never concede that 
they do and must claim that they do no 
more than discover it, hence suggesting 
that there are citizens who are naive 
enough to believe them. Second, Justice 
SCALIA, fearful of our ability and that of 
other judges to resist the temptation to 
overrule prior cases, would maximize the 
injury to the public interest when overrul-
ing occurs, which would tend to deter them 
from departing from established precedent. 
I am quite unpersuaded by this line of 
reasoning and hence concur in the judg-
ment on the narrower ground employed by 
Justice SOUTER. 
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom 
Justice MARSHALL and Justice SCALIA 
join, concurring in the judgment. 
I join Justice SCALIA's opinion because I 
agree that failure to apply a newly de-
clared constitutional rule to cases pending 
on direct review violates basic norms of 
constitutional adjudication. It seems to me 
that our decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 
(1987), makes clear that this Court's func-
tion in articulating new rules of decision 
must comport with its duty to decide only 
"cases'' and "controversies." See U.S. 
Con»t., Art. Ill, § 2, el. 1. Unlike a legisla-
ture, we do not promulgate new rules to 
"be applied prospectively only," as the dis-
sent, post, at 24f>0, and perhaps the Court, 
411, 422. 84 S.U 461, 468, 11 L.Hd.2d 440 
(1964); Chicot County Drainage Ut*t. v. Baxter 
State Bank. 308 U.S. 371. 374, 60 S Ct. 317, 318, 
84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). 
^ n o u 
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would have it. The nature of judicial re-
view constrains us to consider the case that 
is actually before us, and, if it requires us 
to announce a new rule, to do so in the 
context of the case and apply it to the 
parties who brought us the case to decide. 
To do otherwise is to warp the role that we, 
as judges, play in a government of limited 
powers. 
1 do not read Justice SCALIA's com-
ments on the division of federal powers to 
reject the idea expressed so well by the last 
Justice Harlan that selective application of 
new rules violates the principle of treating 
similarly situated defendants the same. 
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
678-679, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1172-1173, 28 
L.Ed.2d 404 (1971), and Desist v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-259, 89 S.Ct. 
1030, 1038-1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) (dis-
senting opinion), on which Griffith relied. 
This rule, which we have characterized as a 
question of equity, is not the remedial equi-
ty that the dissent seems to believe can 
trump the role of adjudication in our consti-
tutional scheme. See post, at 2451. It 
derives from the integrity of judicial re-
view, which does not justify applying prin-
ciples determined to be wrong to litigants 
who are in or may still come to court. We 
fulfill our judicial responsibility by requir-
ing retroactive application of each new rule 
wre announce. 
Application of new decisional rules does 
not thwart the principles of stare decisis, 
as the dissent suggests. See post, at 2452. 
The doctrine of stare decisis profoundly 
serves important purposes in our legal sys-
tem. Nearly a half century ago, Justice 
Roberts cautioned: "Respect for tribunals 
must fall when the bar and the public come 
to understand that nothing that has been 
said in prior adjudication has force in a 
current controversy." Mahnich v. South-
ern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113, 64 S.Ct. 455, 
463, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944) (dissenting opin-
ion). The present dissent's view of stare 
decisis would rob the doctrine of its vitality 
through eliminating the tension between 
the current controversy and the new rule. 
By announcing new rules prospectively or 
by applying them selectively, a court miy 
dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding 
the disruption of settled expectations that 
otherwise prevents us from disturbing our 
settled precedents. Because it forces us to 
consider the disruption that our new deci-
sional rules cause, retroactivity combines 
with stare, decisis to prevent us from alter-
ing the law each time the opportunity 
presents itself. 
Like Justice SCALIA, I conclude that 
prospectivity, whether "selective" or 
"pure," breaches our obligation to dis-
charge our constitutional function. 
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice 
MARSHALL and Justice BLACKMUN 
join, concurring in the judgment. 
I think 1 agree, as an abstract matter, 
with Justice SOUTER's reasoning, but that 
is not what leads me to agree with his 
conclusion. I would no more say that what 
he calls "selective prospectivity" is imper-
missible because it produces inequitable re-
sults than I would say that the coercion of 
confessions is impermissible for that rea-
son. I believe that the one, like the other, 
is impermissible simply because it is not 
allowed by the Constitution. Deciding be-
tween a constitutional course and an uncon-
stitutional one does not pose a question of 
choice of law. 
If the division of federal powers central 
to the constitutional scheme is to succeed 
in its objective, it seems to me that the 
fundamental nature of those powers must 
be preserved as that nature was under-
stood when the Constitution was enacted. 
The Executive, for example, in addition to 
"tak(ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed," Art. II, § 3, has no power to 
bind private conduct in areas not specifical-
ly committed to his control by Constitution 
or statute; such a perception of "[tjhe Ex-
ecutive jxjwer" may be familiar to other 
legal systems, but is alien to our own. So 
also, I think, "[t)he judicial Power of the 
United States" conferred upon this Court 
and such inferior courts as Congress may 
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establish, Art. Ill, § 1, must be deemed to 
be the judicial power as understood by our 
common-law tradition. That is the power 
"to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), 
not the power to change it. I am not so 
naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as 
to be unaware that judges in a real sense 
"make" law. But they make it as judges 
make it, which is to say as though they 
were "finding" it—discerning what the law 
is, rather than decreeing what it is today 
changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. 
Of course this mode of action poses "diffi-
culties of a . . . practical sort," ante, at 
2443, when courts decide to overrule prior 
precedent. But those difficulties are one 
of the understood checks upon judicial law 
making; to eliminate them is to render 
courts substantially more free to "make 
new law," and thus to alter in a fundamen-
tal way the assigned balance of responsibil-
ity and power among the three Branches. 
For this reason, and not reasons of equi-
ty, I would find both "selective prospectivi-
ty" and "pure prospectivity" beyond our 
power. 
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Chief 
Justice REHNQU1ST and Justice 
KENNEDY join, dissenting. 
The Court extends application of the new 
rule announced in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 
L.Ed.2d 200 (1984), retroactively to all par-
ties, without consideration of the analysis 
described in Chevron Oil Co. v. Hxison, 
404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 
(1971). Justice SOUTER bases this deter-
mination on "principles of equality and 
stare decisis/* Ante, at . To my 
mind, both of these factors lead to precise-
ly the opposite result. 
Justice BLACKMUN and Justice 
SCALIA concur in the judgment of the 
Court but would abrogate completely the 
Chevron Oil inquiry and hold that all deci-
sions must be applied retroactively in all 
cases. I explained last Term that such a 
rule ignores well-settled precedent in which 
this Court has refused repeatedly to apply 
new rules retroactively in civil cases. See 
American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 496 
U.S. . , 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2327-
2343, 110 LEd.2d 148 (opinion of O'CON-
NOR, J.). There is no need to repeat that 
discussion here. I reiterate, however, that 
precisely because this Court has "the pow-
er 'to say what the law is,' Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803)," ante, at 2450 (SCALIA, J., concur-
ring), when the Court changes its mind, the 
law changes with it. If the Court decides, 
in the context of a civil case or controversy, 
to change the law, it must make the subse-
quent determination whether the new law 
or the old is to apply to conduct occurring 
before the law-changing decision. Chev-
ron Oil describes our long-established pro-
cedure for making this inquiry. 
I 
I agree that the Court in Bacchus ap-
plied its rule retroactively to the parties 
before it. The Bacchus opinion is silent on 
the retroactivity question. Given that the 
usual course in cases before this Court is to 
apply the rule announced to the parties in 
the case, the most reasonable reading of 
silence is that the Court followed iu cus-
tomary practice. 
The Bacchus Court erred in applying its 
rule retroactively. It did not employ the 
Chevron Oil analysis, but should have. 
Had it done so, the Court would have con-
cluded that the Bacchus rule should be 
applied prospectively only. Justice SOUT-
ER today concludes that, even in the ab-
sence of an independent examination of 
retroactivity, once the Court applies a new 
rule retroactively to the parties before it, it 
must thereafter apply the rule retroac-
tively to everyone. I disagree. Without a 
determination that retroactivity is appropri-
ate under Chevron Oil, neither equality 
nor stare decisis leads to this result. 
As to "equality," Justice SOUTER be-
lieves that it would be unfair to withhold 
the benefit of the new rule in Bacchus to 
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litigants similarly situated to those who 
received the benefit in that case. Ante, at 
2444, 2440. If Justice SOUTER is con-
cerned with fairness, he cannot ignore 
Chevron Oil; the purpose of the Chevron 
Oil test is to determine the equities of 
retroactive application of a new rule. See 
Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S., at 107-108, 
1)2 S.CL, at 3r>r>-;jf>(i; Smith, supra, at 
, 110 S.Ct., at . Had the Bacchus 
Court determined that retroactivity would 
be appropriate under Chevron Oil, or had 
this C/Ourt made that determination now, 
retroactive application would be fair. 
Where the Chevron Oil analysis indicates 
that retroactivity is not appropriate, how-
ever, just the opposite is true. If retroac-
tive application was inequitable in Bacchus 
itself, the Court only hinders the cause of 
fairness by repeating the mistake. Be-
cause 1 conclude that the Chevron Oil test 
dictates that Bacchus not be applied retro-
actively, I would decline the Court's invita-
tion to impose liability on every jurisdiction 
in the Nation that reasonably relied on 
prt-Bacchus law. 
Justice SOUTER also explains that 
"stare decisis11 compels its result. Ante, 
at 244G. By this, I assume he means that 
the retroactive application of the Bacchus 
rule to the parties in that case is itself a 
decision of the Court to which the Court 
should now defer in deciding the retroactiv-
ity question in this case. This is not a 
proper application of stare decisis. The 
Court in Bacchus applied its rule retroac-
tively to the parties before it without any 
analysis of the issue. This tells us nothing 
about how this case—where the Chevron 
Oil question is squarely presented—should 
come out. 
Contrary to Justice SOUTER's asser-
tions, stare decisis cuts the other way in 
this case. At its core, stare decisis allows 
those affected by the law to order their 
affairs without fear that the established 
law upon which they rely will suddenly be 
pulled out from under them. A decision 
not to apply a new rule retroactively is 
based on principles of stare decisis. By 
not applying a law-changing decision retro-
actively, a court respects the settled expec-
tations that have built up around the old 
law. See, American Trucking, supra, at 
, 110 S.Ct, at 2341 (opinion of 
O'CONNOR, J.) ("prospective overruling 
allows courts to respect the principle of 
stare decisis even when they are impelled 
to change the law in light of new under-
standing"); id., at , 110 S.Ct, at 2345 
(SCA1JA, J., concurring in judgment) (im 
position of retroactive liability on a litigant 
would "upset that litigant's settled expec-
tations because the earlier decision for 
which stare decisis effect is claimed . . . 
overruled prior law. That would turn the 
doctrine of stare decisis against the very 
purpose for which it exists"). If a Chev-
ron Oil analysis reveals, as it does, that 
retroactive application of Bacchus would 
unjustly undermine settled expectations, 
stare decisis dictates strongly against the 
Court's holding. 
Justice SOUTER purports to have re-
stricted the application of Chevron Oil 
only to a limited extent. Ante, at 2447. 
The effect appears to me far greater. Jus-
tice SOUTER concludes that the Chevron 
Oil analysis, if ignored in answering the 
narrow question of retroactivity as to the 
parties to a particular case, must be ig-
nored also in answering the far broader 
question of retroactivity as to all other 
parties. But it is precisely in determining 
general retroactivity that the Chevron Oil 
test is most needed; the broader the poten-
tial reach of a new rule, the greater the 
potential disruption of settled expectations. 
The inquiry the Court summarized in Chev-
ron Oil represents longstanding doctrine 
on the application of nonretroactivity to 
civil cases. See American Trucking, su-
pra, at , 110 S.Ct, at 
. Justice SOUTER today ignores this 
well-established precedent, and seriously 
curtails the Chevroyi Oil inquiry. His re-
liance upon stare decisis in reaching this 
conclusion becomes all the more ironic. 
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Faithful to this Court's decisions, the 
Georgia Supreme Court in this case applied 
the analysis described in Chevron Oil in 
deciding the retroactivity question before 
it. Subsequently, this Court has gone out 
of its way to ignore that analysis. A prop-
er application of Chevron Oil demon-
strates, however, that Bacchus should not 
be applied retroactively. 
Chevron Oil describes a three-part in-
quiry in determining whether a decision of 
this Court will have prospective effect only: 
"First, the decision to be applied nonret-
roactively must establish a new principle 
of law, either by overruling clear past 
precedent on which litigants may have 
relied, or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not 
clearly foreshadowed. Second, . . . we 
must . . . weigh the merits and demerits 
in each case by looking to the prior histo-
ry of the rule in question, its purpose and 
effect, and whether retrospective opera-
tion will further or retard its operation. 
Finally, we [must] weig[h] the inequity 
imposed by retroactive application, for 
[wjhere a decision of this Court could 
produce substantial inequitable results if 
applied retroactively, there is ample basis 
in our cases for avoiding the injustice or 
hardship by a holding of nonretroactivi-
ty." 404 U.S., at 106-107, 92 S.Ct., at 
355 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
BacchiLS easily meets the first criterion. 
That case considered a Hawaii excise tax 
on alcohol sales that exempted certain lo-
cally produced liquor. The Court held that 
the tax, by discriminating in favor of local 
products, violated the Commerce Clause, 
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, by interfering 
with interstate commerce. 468 U.S., at 
273, 104 S.Ct, at 3056. The Court rejected 
the State's argument that any violation of 
ordinary Commerce Clause principles was, 
in the case of alcohol sales, overborne by 
the State's plenary powers under § 2 of the 
Twenty-first Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. That section provides: 
'The transportation or importation into 
any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States for delivery or use therein 
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The Court noted that language in some 
of our earlier opinions indicated that § 2 
did indeed give the States broad power to 
establish the terms under which imported 
liquor might compete with domestic. See 
468 U.S., at 274, and n. 13, 104 S.Ct., at 
3057, and n. 13. Nonetheless, the Court 
concluded that other cases had by then 
established "that the [Twenty-first] 
Amendment did not entirely remove state 
regulation of alcoholic beverages from the 
ambit of the Commerce Clause." Id., at 
275, 104 S.Ct., at 3057. Relying on Hostet-
ter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 
377 U.S. 324, 84 S.Ct. 1293, 12 L.Ed.2d 350 
(1964), California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980), 
and Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 
467 U.S. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 
(1984), the Court concluded that § 2 did not 
protect the State from liability for econom-
ic protectionism. 468 U.S., at 275-276, 104 
S.Ct., at 3057-3058. 
The Court's conclusion in Bacchus was 
unprecedented. Beginning with State 
Board of Equalization of California v. 
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 57 S.Ct. 
77, 81 L.Ed. 38 (1936), an uninterrupted line 
of authority from this Court held that 
States need not meet the strictures of the 
so-called "dormant" or "negative" Com-
merce Clause when regulating sales and 
importation of liquor within the State. 
Young's Market is directly on point 
There, the Court rejected precisely the ar-
gument it eventually accepted in Bacchus. 
The California statute at issue in Young's 
Market imposed a license fee for the privi-
lege of importing beer into the State. The 
Court concluded that "(p]rior to the Twen-
ty-first Amendment it would obviously 
have been unconstitutional to have imposed 
any fee for that privilege" because doing 
so directly burdens interstate commerce. 
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299 U.S., at 62, 57 S.Ct., at 78. Section 2 
changed all of that. The Court answered 
appellees' assertion that § 2 did not abro-
gate negative Commerce Clause restric-
tions. The contrast between this discus-
sion and the Court's rule in Bacchus is 
stark: 
"[Appeilees] request us to construe the 
Amendment as saying, in effect: The 
State may prohibit the importation of 
intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits 
the manufacture and sale within its bor-
ders; but if it permits such manufacture 
and sale, it must let imported liquors 
compete with the domestic on equal 
terms. To say that, would involve not a 
construction of the Amendment, but a 
rewriting of it. 
"The plaintiffs argue that, despite the 
Amendment, a State may not regulate 
importations except for the purpose of 
protecting the public health, safety or 
morals; and that the importer's license 
fee was not imposed to that end. Surely 
the State may adopt a lesser degree of 
regulation than total prohibition. Can it 
be doubted that a State might establish a 
state monopoly of the manufacture and 
sale of beer, and either prohibit all com-
peting importations, or discourage impor-
tation by laying a heavy impost, or chan-
nelize desired importations by confining 
them to a single consignee?" Id., at 
62-63, 57 S.Ct., at 78-79. 
Numerous cases following Young's Mar-
ket are to the same effect, recognizing the 
States' broad authority to regulate com-
merce in intoxicating beverages uncon-
strained by negative Commerce Clause re-
strictions. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 
308 U.S. 132, 138, 60 S.Ct. 163, 166, 84 
L.Ed. 128 (1939); United States v. Frank-
fort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299, 65 
S.Ct. 661. 664. 89 L.Ed. 951 (1945); Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 
35, 42, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 1259, 16 L.Ed.2d 336 
(1966); Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina 
Tax Cornm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 283-284, 93 
S.Ct. 483, 488-489, 34 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972); 
see generally Bacchus, supra, at 281-282, 
104 S.Ct., at 3060-3061 (STEVENS, J., du-
senting). 
The cases that the Bacchus Court cited 
in support of its new rule in fact provided 
no notice whatsoever of the impending 
change. Idle wild, Mi den I, and Capital 
Cities, supra, all involved States' authority 
to regulate the sale and importation of 
alcohol when doing so conflicted directly 
with legislation passed by Congress pursu-
ant to its powers under the Commerce 
Clause. The Court in each case held that 
§ 2 did not give Suites the authority to 
override congressional legislation. The:* 
essentially were Supremacy Clause cases, 
in that context, the Court concluded that 
the Twenty-first Amendment had not "re-
pealed" the Commerce Clause. See Idlcu?-
ild, supra, 377 U.S., at 331-332, 84 S.Ct., at 
1297-1298; Midcal, supra, 445 U.S., at 
108-109, 100 S.Ct., at 944-945; Capital 
Cities, supra, 467 U.S., at 712-713, 104 
S.Ct., at 2707. 
These cases are irrelevant to Bacchus 
because they involved the relation between 
§ 2 and Congress' authority to legislate 
under the (positive) Commerce Clause. 
Bacchus and the Young's Market line con-
cerned States' authority to regulate liquor 
unconstrained by the negative Commerce 
Clause in the absence of any congressional 
pronouncement. This distinction was clear 
from Idleunld, Midcal, and Capital Cities 
themselves. Idle.wild and Capital Cities 
acknowledged explicitly that § 2 trumps 
the negative Commerce Clause. See Idlew-
ild, supra, 377 U.S., at 330, 84 S.Ct., at 
1296 (" 'Since the Twenty-first Amendment, 
. . . the right of a state to prohibit or regu-
late the importation of intoxicating liquor is 
not limited by the commerce clause — ' " ) , 
quoting Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Li-
quor Control Cornm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394, 
59 S.Ct. 254, 255, 83 L.Ed. 243 (1939); Cap-
ita/ Cities, supra, 467 U.S., at 712, 104 
S.Ct., at 2707 f 4This Court's decisions ... 
have confirmed that the [Twenty-first] 
Amendment primarily created an exception 
to the normal operation of the Commerce 
Clause/ . . . § 2 reserves to the States pow-
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er to impose burdens on interstate com-
merce in intoxicating liquor that, absent 
the Amendment, would clearly be invalid 
under the Commerce Clause"), quoting 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206, 97 S.Ct. 
451, 461, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). 
In short, Bacchus' rule that the Com-
merce Clause places restrictions on state 
power under § 2 in the absence of any 
congressional action came out of the blue. 
Bacchus overruled the Young's Market 
line in this regard and created a new rule. 
See Bacchus, 468 U.S., at 278-287, 104 
S.Ct., at 3059-3064 (STFA'ENS, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining just how new the rule of 
that case was). 
There is nothing in the nature of the 
Bacchus rule that dictates retroactive ap-
plication. The negative Commerce Clause, 
which underlies that rule, prohibits States 
from interfering with interstate commerce. 
As to its application in Bacchus, that pur-
pose is fully served if States are, from the 
date of that decision, prevented from enact-
ing similar tax schemes. Petitioner James 
Beam argues that the purposes of the Com-
merce Clause will not be served fully un-
less Bacchus is applied retroactively. The 
company contends that retroactive applica-
tion will further deter States from enacting 
such schemes. The argument fails. Be-
fore our decision in Bacchus, the State of 
Georgia was fully justified in believing that 
the tax at issue in this case did not violate 
the Commerce Clause. Indeed, before Bac-
chus it did not violate the Commerce 
Clause. The imposition of liability in hind-
sight against a State that, acting reason-
ably would do the same thing again, will 
prevent no unconstitutionality. See Amer-
ican Trucking, 496 U.S., at , 110 S.Ct., 
at (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). 
Precisely because Bacchus was so un-
precedented, the equities weigh heavily 
against retroactive application of the rule 
announced in that case. "Where a State 
can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax 
statutes, its reliance interests may merit 
little concern . . . . By contrast, because the 
State cannot be expected to foresee that a 
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decision of this Court would overturn es-
tablished precedents, the inequity of unset-
tling actions taken in reliance on those 
precedents is apparent." American 
Trucking, supra, at , 110 S.Ct., at 
2333 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). In this 
case, Georgia reasonably relied not only on 
the Young's Market line of cases from this 
Court, but a Georgia Supreme Court deci-
sion upholding the predecessor to the tax 
statute at issue. See Scott v. Georgia, 187 
Ga. 702, 705, 2 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1939), relying 
on Young's Market and Indianapolis 
Brewing. 
Nor is there much to weigh in the bal-
ance. Before Bacchus, the legitimate ex-
pectation of James Beam and other liquor 
manufacturers was that they had to pay 
the tax here at issue and that it was consti-
tutional. They made their business deci-
sions accordingly. There is little hardship 
to these companies from not receiving a tax 
refund they had no reason to anticipate. 
The equitable analysis of Chevron Oil 
places limitations on the liability that may 
be imposed on unsuspecting parties after 
this Court changes the law. James Beam 
claims that if Bacchus is applied retroac-
tively, and the Georgia excise tax is de-
clared to have been collected unconstitu-
tionally from 1982 to 1984, the State owes 
the company a $2.4 million refund. App. 8. 
There are at least two identical refund ac-
tions pending m the Georgia courts. These 
plaintiffs seek refunds of almost $28 mil-
lion. See Heublein, Inc. v. Georgia, Civ. 
Action No. 87-3542-6 (DeKalb Super.Ct., 
Apr. 24, 1987); Joseph E. Seagram & 
Sons, Inc. v. Georgia, Civ.Action No. 87-
7070-8 (DeKalb Super.Ct., Sept. 4, 1987). 
Brief for Respondents 26, n. 8. The State 
estimates its total potential liability to all 
those taxed at $30 million. Id., at 30. To 
impose on Georgia and the other States 
that reasonably relied on this Court's es-
tablished precedent such extraordinary ret-
roactive liability, at a time when most 
States are struggling to fund even the 
most basic services, is the height of unfair-
ness. 
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We are not concerned here with a Stale 
that reaped an unconstitutional windfall 
from its taxpayers. Georgia collected in 
good faith what was at the tune a constitu-
tional tax. The Court now subjects the 
State to potentially devastating liability 
without fair warning. Tins burden will fall 
not on .some corrupt slate government, but 
ultimately on the blameless and unexpect-
ing citizens of Georgia in the form of high-
er taxes and reduced benefits. Nothing in 
our jurisprudence compels that result; our 
traditional analysis of retroactivity dictates 
against it. 
A fair application of the Chevron Oil 
analysis requires that Bacchus not be ap-
plied retroactively. It should not have 
been applied even to the parties in that 
case. That mistake was made. The Court 
today compounds the problem by imposing 
widespread liability on parties having no 
reason to expect it. This decision is made 
in the name of "equality" and "stare deci-
sis/' By refusing to take into account the 
settled expectations of those who relied on 
this Court's established precedents, the 
Court's decision perverLs the meaning of 
both those terms. I respectfully dissent. 
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Establishments wishing to provide to-
tally nude dancing as entertainment and 
individual dancers employed at establish-
